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A BALANCED CONSIDERATION OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S
CHOICE-OF-LAW RULE
Jennifer E. Sturiale*
Abstract
The Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction is unique. Unlike the jurisdiction
of all other U.S. courts of appeals, the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction is
defined not by its geographical boundaries, but rather by the subject
matter of the original claims and compulsory counterclaims. The court has
appellate jurisdiction over final decisions from all U.S. district courts if a
plaintiff’s claim or a party’s counterclaim arises under the patent laws.
From this unusual jurisdictional grant, the Federal Circuit has concluded
that, as a policy matter, it should apply and develop its own law only if the
legal issue pertains to patent law. For all other legal issues, the Federal
Circuit defers to the law of the court of appeals in which the case
originated—i.e., it applies the procedural law and the non-patent
substantive law of the regional circuits.
This Article undertakes a thorough evaluation of the Federal
Circuit’s choice-of-law rule. It examines how the rule compares against
the congressional objectives reflected in the court’s enabling statute as
well as against possible alternative rules. In addition, it considers how the
court’s rule causes the court to depart from the trans-substantivity
principle of procedural law and a related principle of equity in a nontransparent manner, and, in doing so, engage in substantive lawmaking
that may be beyond the court’s authority. Finally, this Article
contemplates solutions beyond a mere change in the court’s choice-of-law
rule.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In a 2014 decision, In re Barnes & Noble, Inc.,1 the Federal Circuit reviewed a
district court’s decision denying the defendant’s motion to transfer.2 The defendant
petitioned the Federal Circuit for a writ of mandamus, ordering the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Tennessee to vacate its order denying the
defendant’s motion to transfer the case to the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California, and ordering the court to transfer the case.3 Ultimately, the
Federal Circuit denied the defendant’s writ, causing the case to remain in the
Western District of Tennessee.4
The Federal Circuit’s decision is short. But it yielded a dissent.5 At first blush,
the disagreement between the majority and the dissent appears to be about what law
should apply: the law of the Fifth Circuit or the law of the Sixth Circuit.6 This
disagreement, alone, is a bit peculiar. After all, federal appellate courts typically
apply their own law or the law of the court that directly reviews their decisions—
that is, the law of the Supreme Court.
The Federal Circuit, however, applies an unusual choice-of-law rule. Pursuant
to the rule, the court considers not which of two or more states’ or nations’ laws it
should apply by doing a comparative analysis of the sovereigns’ laws and interests.7
Rather, the court considers which court of appeals’ law to apply—its own law or the
law of the regional circuit court in which the case originated. Pursuant to this rule,
the Federal Circuit applies and develops its own law only if the legal issue pertains
to patent law.8 For all other legal issues, the Federal Circuit defers to the law of the
court of appeals that embraces the district court in which the case first arose. Thus,
the Federal Circuit “review[s] procedural matters, that are not unique to patent
issues, under the law of the particular regional circuit court where appeals from the
district court would normally lie.”9 And it reviews non-patent, substantive law issues
under the law of the regional circuit court in which the case originated.10 For
1

743 F.3d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Id. at 1382.
3
Id.
4
Id. at 1384.
5
Id. at 1384–85.
6
Id. at 1384–85.
7
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 2 (AM. LAW. INST. 1971); id.
§ 6 (discussing choice-of-law analysis).
8
See Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(per curiam) (“The requirement to obey the law of its circuit causes practitioners and district
judges, in general, to follow the substantive patent law as set forth by this court in ‘patent’
cases and to follow the ‘general’ laws as set forth by their regional circuit court in non-patent
cases.”).
9
Id. at 1574–75.
10
See Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1439 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“The
freedom of the district courts to follow the guidance of their particular circuits in all but the
substantive law fields assigned exclusively to this court is recognized in the foregoing
2
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example, when the Federal Circuit reviews a district court’s decision to grant or deny
a motion to transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), it will apply the precedent of
the regional court of appeals in which the case originated.11 Thus, if a case originated
in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, but was transferred to the
Northern District of California, a plaintiff’s petition for writ of mandamus to the
Federal Circuit challenging the transfer would be reviewed under the law of the Fifth
Circuit, where the Eastern District of Texas is located.
The court’s rule derives from the court’s unique jurisdictional grant. Unlike the
jurisdiction of all other U.S. courts of appeals, the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction is
defined not by its geographical boundaries, but rather by the subject matter of the
original claims and compulsory counterclaims. The Federal Circuit has appellate
jurisdiction over final decisions from all U.S. district courts if at least one of the
plaintiff’s claims or a party’s compulsory counterclaim “aris[es] under” the patent
laws.12 As a result of this jurisdictional grant, the Federal Circuit can review
decisions from all ninety-four federal district courts, situated within all twelve of the
regional circuits. Appeals from cases that do not—and never did13—contain issues
of patent law, however, are appealed to the regional circuit court embracing the
district court.14 Thus, following the Federal Circuit’s creation, some of the cases
decided by district courts are appealable to the regional circuit courts, while others
are appealable to the Federal Circuit. Mindful of the challenge these dual appellate
paths present to the district courts, especially when deciding procedural issues, the
Federal Circuit adopted its choice-of-law rule “as a matter of policy.”15
The Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule has prompted criticism from scholars
and commentators, particularly as the rule relates to procedural law. Most have noted
the incoherence, inconsistent application, and unworkability of the rule.16 The
opinions and in this case.”).
11
See Barnes & Noble, 743 F.3d at 1383.
12
See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2018).
13
See infra note 264.
14
See 28 U.S.C. § 1294(1) (2018).
15
Panduit Corp v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1574–75 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(per curiam).
16
See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in
Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 40 (1989) [hereinafter Dreyfuss, A Case Study]
(“The indeterminacy of the [Federal Circuit’s] line drawing has led different panels to reach
inconsistent conclusions on whether regional law or Federal Circuit law applies to given
procedural issues.”); id. at 59 (“The rule requiring the [Federal Circuit] to defer to regional
law in nonpatent substantive areas does not work well . . . .”); see also Kimberly A. Moore,
Juries, Patent Cases, & a Lack of Transparency, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 779, 800 (2002) (“While
seemingly straight-forward, the current choice of law rule, requiring the court to apply
regional circuit law on a procedural issue unless it is ‘unique to’ patent law, has proven
elusive in practice.”); see generally Peter J. Karol, Who’s at the Helm? The Federal Circuit’s
Rule of Deference and the Systematic Absence of Controlling Precedent in Matters of Patent
Litigation Procedure, 37 AIPLA Q. J. 1 (2009) (noting the rule’s “mutability and uncertain
usage”); Ted L. Field, Improving the Federal Circuit’s Choice of Law for Procedural
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disagreement between the majority and the dissent in Barnes & Noble over the
appropriate precedent suggests there is something to these critiques. Most
commentators have accordingly proposed that the Federal Circuit discard its choiceof-law rule and, instead, develop and apply its own procedural law. 17 Some have
proposed a systematic approach for determining whether a case raises a procedural
issue pertinent to patent law.18 Yet others have simply implored the Federal Circuit
for more guidance.19
This Article takes a more cautious approach. First, it undertakes a more
thorough evaluation of the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule, including how the
rule fits the congressional objectives reflected in the court’s enabling statute and
how it compares to alternative rules. One of those objectives was to develop patent
law in a more uniform manner; an insight of this Article’s evaluation is that the
court’s rule undermines its efforts to unify patent law. Second, this Article considers
how the rule causes the court to depart from the trans-substantivity principle of
procedural law and a related principle of equity. One understanding of that principle
of equity requires judges to treat substantively similar cases in a procedurally similar
Matters in Patent Cases, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 643, 664–65 (2009) (noting the Federal
Circuit’s many articulations and inconsistent applications its choice-of-law rule); Roni A.
Elias, Towards Solving the Problem of a Substantive-Law Circuit in a Regional Appellate
System: How to Reform the Jurisdictional and Choice-of-Law Rules for the Federal Circuit
to Promote Uniformity and Predictability in Patent Law, 98 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 40, 65 (2016) (“Because these [choice-of-law] rules are complex and interdependent,
it is not always clear during litigation in the district court which rules of law should apply.”).
17
See, e.g., Dreyfuss, A Case Study, supra note 16, at 44–45 (suggesting that the Federal
Circuit permit parties to sever issues “far removed from patent law,” try them separately, and
appeal them to the regional circuits, and that the Federal Circuit apply its own law to all other
issues appealed to it “in the same way that every other federal appellate court is permitted to
construe open issues of federal law”); see also Moore, supra note 16, at 800 (considering the
Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule and its effects on the court’s ability to control the form
of jury verdicts and proposing the court “apply its own law to all procedural issues arising in
patent cases”); Karol, supra note 16, at 3 (suggesting the Federal Circuit apply its own law
to procedural issues); Field, supra note 16, at 692–98 (suggesting the Federal Circuit “apply
its own law to all procedural issues”). But see Joan E. Schaffner, Federal Circuit “Choice of
Law”: Erie Through the Looking Glass, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1173, 1178–79 (1996) (proposing
the Federal Circuit adopt a new choice-of-law rule, pursuant to which the court would defer
to the regional circuit law on “procedural issues that have little or no impact on patent
policy”).
18
See Sean M. McEldowney, Comment, The “Essential Relationship” Spectrum: A
Framework for Addressing Choice of Procedural Law in the Federal Circuit, 153 U. PA. L.
REV. 1639, 1673–76 (2005) (describing a “spectrum” of relationships between procedural
and substantive patent law issues and suggesting the Federal Circuit contextualize issues
along the spectrum).
19
Adam E. Miller, Note, The Choice of Law Rules and the Use of Precedent in the
Federal Circuit: A Unique and Evolving System, 31 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 301, 328 (2006)
(reviewing the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law case law and arguing for “clear guidance on
what law to apply and when”).
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manner in an effort to constrain judicial lawmaking. This Article therefore considers
whether the court’s rule causes the court to treat substantively similar cases in a
procedurally different—and non-transparent—manner and, in doing so, to engage in
lawmaking that may be beyond the limits of its authority. Third, this Article
contemplates solutions beyond a mere change in the court’s choice-of-law rule.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II describes the background that gave
birth to the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule. It recounts the history of the Federal
Circuit, explains the contours of the court’s unique jurisdiction, and describes the
principle cases in which the court adopted and refined its rule. Part III undertakes a
balanced consideration of the court’s rule, examining both its positive and negative
attributes. But this evaluation, alone, does not reveal the rule’s relative worth. Part
IV, therefore, examines the virtues and flaws of alternative choice-of-law rules.
Finally, Part V concludes by considering structural solutions that could obviate the
need for a choice-of-law rule altogether.
II. THE BIRTH OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S CHOICE-OF-LAW RULE
A. The History of the Federal Circuit
The Federal Circuit was established by the Federal Courts Improvement Act
(“FCIA”) of 1982.20 Congress created the court in response to the findings of the
Hruska Commission,21 which undertook to study the federal judiciary.22 Congress
rejected the Commission’s primary recommendation of creating a National Court of
Appeals, but it responded to a secondary finding that patent law presented a special
problem.23 The Commission’s report noted that uniformity of patent law was a
primary concern of practicing patent attorneys.24 The biggest perceived problem was
intra- and inter-circuit conflicts that arose from differences in the application of the

20

(1982).

Federal Courts Improvement Act (FCIA) of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25

21
The Commission’s formal name was the Commission on Revision of the Federal
Court Appellate System, but it became known as the Hruska Commission because Senator
Roman L. Hruska served as the Commission’s chairman. See COMMISSION ON REVISION OF
THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, as reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 195, 196 (1975) [hereinafter
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE]; see also Jack B. Owens, Commentary, The Hruska
Commission’s Proposed National Court of Appeals, 23 UCLA L. REV. 580, 580 (1976)
(noting that the Commission was “undoubtedly to be known as the Hruska Commission”).
22
See RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, supra note 21, at 207–08.
23
See id. at 369–71 (noting that problems existed with patent adjudication).
24
See id. at 370 (noting that patent consultants, Professor James B. Gambrell and
Donald R. Dunner, indicated that their “collective experience” led them to believe that “the
lack of uniformity in decisions on patent-related issues has been a widespread and continuing
fact of life” and that the study “merely confirm[ed]” their judgment).

480

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 2

law.25 In addition, the report noted forum shopping was a concern.26 Moreover, what
was ultimately lacking, the report suggested, was “guidance and monitoring by a
single court whose judgments are nationally binding.” 27 The Supreme Court had
failed to fill this role, so the report recommended the “creation of a national court.”28
The legislative history of FCIA reflects these concerns. It reveals that a primary
purpose of creating the Federal Circuit was to create uniformity in the field of patent
law. The Senate Judiciary Committee explained that one of the primary purposes of
FCIA was to address a congressionally-determined need for uniformity.29 The
Committee traced a lack of uniformity to the inability of the decisions of any one
court of appeals to be binding on the others.30 The creation of the Federal Circuit
was meant to address this problem: “The establishment of the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit [ ] provides a forum that will increase doctrinal stability in the
field of patent law.”31 A House Judiciary Committee Report similarly explained that
“the central purpose [of the FCIA] is to reduce the widespread lack of uniformity
and uncertainty of legal doctrine in the administration of patent law.”32 The
Committee noted that patent litigation was characterized by “unsettling
25
See id. (reporting that forty-eight percent of respondents to a survey indicated that
inter-circuit conflicts “was a cause of considerable impact on disputes involving patentrelated issues”); id. (“Analysis of the data suggested that ‘most of the problem lies in the
intra- and inter-circuit conflicts which arise by virtue of the differences in applying the law
to the facts in particular cases before the court.’”).
26
See id. at 220 (“[T]he perceived disparity in results in different circuits leads to
widespread forum shopping.”); id. at 370 (“‘[D]irectly attributable’ to differences in the
interpretation of and application of the law are ‘forum disputes and the extensive forum
shopping that goes on.’”).
27
Id. at 371.
28
Id.
29
S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 2 (1981), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 12; see also
S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 4 (1981), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 14 (“The creation of
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit provides such a forum for appeals from
throughout the country in areas of the law where Congress determines that there is special
need for national uniformity.”).
30
S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 3 (1981), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 13. The report
explains,

A decision in any one of the twelve regional circuits is not binding on any of the
others. . . . Consequently, there are areas of the law in which the appellate courts
reach inconsistent decision [sic] on the same issue, or in which—although the rule
of law may be fairly clear—courts apply the law unevenly when faced with the
facts of individual cases. The difficulty here is structural. Since the Supreme
Court’s capacity to review cases cannot be enlarged significantly, the remedy lies
in some reorganization at the intermediate appellate level . . . .
Id.
31
S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 5 (1981), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 15.
32
H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 23 (1981).
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inconsistency in adjudications.”33 Conflicting decisions, both the Senate and the
House Judiciary Committees noted, created uncertainty.34 In addition, both the
Senate and the House Judiciary Committees noted that the creation of the Federal
Circuit was meant to address the “acute” problem of forum shopping.35
Finally, although lawmakers intended for the Federal Circuit to unify matters
of patent law, Congress indicated that it did not intend to create a “specialized
court,”36 as such. One of the reasons offered in support of the creation of the Federal
Circuit was that deciding issue after issue of patent law would enable the judges of
the Federal Circuit to hone their skills as patent law jurists and become efficient at
deciding patent law issues. During a hearing related to the creation of the Federal
Circuit, Howard Markey, who would later become the first Chief Judge of the
Federal Circuit, explained, “[I]f I am doing brain surgery every day, day in and day
out, chances are very good that I will do your brain surgery much quicker, or a
number of them, than someone who does brain surgery once every couple of
years.”37 However, as discussed in the next Section, Congress gave the Federal
Circuit jurisdiction over a number of other types of disputes to prevent the costs of
33
H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20 (1981). The legislative history also suggests lawmakers
were concerned with uniformity in the “administration” of the law. See H.R. REP. NO. 97312 (1981) (“Even in circumstances in which there is no conflict as to the actual rule of law,
the courts take such a great variety of approaches and attitudes toward the patent system that
the application of the law to the facts of an individual case produces unevenness in the
administration of the patent law.”); see also S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 3 (1981), as reprinted in
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 13 (“The creation of a new Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit . . . addresses these structural problems. . . . It improves the administration of the
system by reducing the number of decision-making entities within the federal appellate
system.”). Ultimately, however, uniformity in the administration of the law appears at bottom
to be a concern about doctrinal uniformity.
Congress did not find the “unsettling inconsistency in adjudication” of patent litigation
any more troubling than other inconsistencies among circuits found in other areas of law.
Hence, it is questionable whether the creation of the Federal Circuit is well justified.
However, consideration of that issue is beyond the scope of this Article.
34
S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 5 (1981), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 15 (“[I]n a
Commission survey of practitioners, the patent bar indicated that uncertainty created by the
lack of national law precedent was a significant problem.”); H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 21
(1981) (“[T]he primary problem in this area is uncertainty which results from inconsistent
application of the law to the facts of an individual case.”).
35
S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 5 (1981), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 15 (“[T]he
Commission singled out patent law as an area in which widespread forum-shopping is
particularly acute.”); H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20–21 (1981) (“[T]he Commission found
patent law to be an area in which widespread forum-shopping was particularly acute.”).
36
H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 19 (1981) (“The proposed new court is not a ‘specialized
court.’”).
37
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and U.S. Claims Court, 1981: Hearing
on H.R. 2405 Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of
Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 42–43 (1981) (statement of the
Honorable Howard T. Markey, Chief Judge, Court of Customs and Patent Appeals).
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specialization, such as capture by industry, a lack of cross-pollination among legal
theories, and the prevention of the percolation of ideas.38 Thus, in creating the
Federal Circuit, Congress intended to yield the benefits of specialized tribunals
without the costs.39
B. The Federal Circuit’s Jurisdiction
The Federal Circuit’s unique jurisdiction reflects these congressional
objectives. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1295, the Federal Circuit has appellate jurisdiction
over final decisions from a number of specialized courts, such as the United States
Court of Federal Claims40 and the United States Court of International Trade,41 as
well as appeals relating to patent claims, so long as the patent claims satisfy the wellpleaded complaint rule or are included in a compulsory counterclaim.42 Thus,
38

See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, 1990 BYU L. REV. 377,
379–80 [hereinafter Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication] (describing the costs of
specialization).
39
Id. at 404 (“Congress decided to create a new kind of specialized tribunal; one with
the exclusivity necessary to achieve uniformity of patent law, the concentration of patent
cases needed to develop expertise, and enough other business to prevent the court from
succumbing to the dangers fostered by specialization.”).
40
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3) (2018).
41
Id. § 1295(a)(5).
42
Id. § 1295(a)(1). Section 1295(a)(1) specifically provides, “The United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction of an appeal from a final
decision of a district court of the United States . . . in any civil action arising under, or in any
civil action in which a party has asserted a compulsory counterclaim arising under, any Act
of Congress relating to patents.”
The Federal Circuit did not initially have jurisdiction over counterclaims pertaining to
patent law. The first enacted version of the Federal Circuit’s jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295 (1982), provided the Federal Circuit with jurisdiction over appeals from final
decisions of the district courts if the district court’s jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338. See Federal Courts Improvement Act (FCIA) of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 127(a),
96 Stat. 25, 37 (1982). Section 1338, in turn, provided that “the district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents.”
28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1982). Consistent with Supreme Court cases construing the “arising
under” language of the federal question jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, see
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1983), the Supreme
Court construed the “arising under” language in §1338 to mean the Federal Circuit only had
jurisdiction over patent claims on the face of the complaint; it did not, however, have
appellate jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaims pertaining to patent law, Christianson
v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 814–15 (1988).
The Federal Circuit’s jurisdictional statute was eventually amended by the America
Invents Act. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 19(b), 125 Stat. 284,
331–32 (2011) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §1295(a) (2018)). The amended version of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295(a)(1) untethered the statute from § 1338—i.e., from the district court’s jurisdiction—
but incorporated the same “arising under” language. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1)
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because a patent claim can be brought in any of the United States federal district
courts, with respect to decisions relating to patent law, the Federal Circuit can hear
appeals from as many as ninety-four district courts.
Importantly, in Atari, Inc. v. JSA Group, Inc.,43 the Federal Circuit interpreted
its jurisdictional grant as extending to an entire case, not just to the “patent issues.”44
Atari raised challenging questions of the breadth of the Federal Circuit’s appellate
jurisdiction that are worth considering because of their implications for the Federal
Circuit’s choice-of-law rule. The plaintiff, Atari, filed suit in the Northern District
of Illinois, alleging contributory copyright infringement, patent infringement, and
five non-patent claims.45 The plaintiff’s claims stemmed from the defendant’s
advertising and sale of blank cartridges and a device designed to copy Atari games.46
A few weeks after Atari filed suit, the district court granted Atari a preliminary
injunction, enjoining the defendant from selling its blank cartridges; the purpose of
the injunction was to protect Atari’s rights under the Copyright Act.47 The blank
cartridges were also the subject of the patent infringement claims, so the injunction
effectively enjoined some acts of patent infringement as well.48
After the injunction was granted, Atari moved to separate the patent claim
pursuant to Rule 42(b), which permits a court to order separate trials for one or more
issues. The sole purpose of separating the patent claim was to attempt to direct the
appeal of the copyright issue to the Seventh Circuit, rather than to the Federal Circuit

(1982), with 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2018). Commentators and scholars have consequently
construed the amended version of § 1295(a)(1) as incorporating the jurisdictional
requirement that the patent-related action be on the face of a well-pleaded complaint. See,
e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia, Counterclaims, the Well-Pleaded Complaint, and Federal
Jurisdiction, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 12–13 (2004).
In addition, under the amended version of § 1295(a)(1), the court now has jurisdiction
over compulsory counterclaims “arising under” the patent laws, which likely also must
comply with the well-pleaded complaint rule, or, as the Federal Circuit described in a case
that pre-dated the amendment to its jurisdictional statute, the “well-pleaded counterclaim”
rule. See Aerojet-General Corp. v. Machine Tool Works, Oerlikon-Buehrle Ltd., 895 F.2d
736, 742 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Thus, the court does not have jurisdiction over cases or
counterclaims where patent law neither creates the cause of action or the compulsory
counterclaim nor is a necessary element to the plaintiff’s well-pleaded claims or the
defendant’s well-pleaded counterclaims.
43
747 F.2d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
44
Id. at 1433–35 (describing “issue jurisdiction” and concluding that Congress rejected
“issue jurisdiction” for the Federal Circuit); id. at 1436 (“Congress specifically rejected
Atari’s present suggestion that this court should have only ‘issue’ jurisdiction and that
appeals involving patent and non-patent issues should be bifurcated.”).
45
Plaintiff’s other claims included a claim for unfair competition, deceptive trade
practices, fraud, unfair competition under Illinois law, and misappropriation. Id. at 1424.
46
See id.; Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 5, 7 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
47
Atari, 597 F. Supp. at 10.
48
Id. at 7.
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along with the patent claims.49 The defendant appealed the preliminary injunction to
the Federal Circuit, and Atari filed a motion to transfer the appeal to the Seventh
Circuit,50 claiming the Federal Circuit lacked jurisdiction.51
The question before the Federal Circuit was the effect of the order separating
the claims on the court’s jurisdiction.52 The Federal Circuit concluded that it had
jurisdiction over the appeal. Section 1295, the court reasoned, grants the Federal
Circuit exclusive appellate jurisdiction over appeals when the basis for the district
court’s jurisdiction is that the case arises under patent law.53 In addition, because
§ 1295 granted the Federal Circuit “arising under” jurisdiction, it granted the court
jurisdiction over “cases,” not “issues.”54 The district court’s separation order did not
affect the district court’s jurisdiction over the case and, therefore, did not affect the
Federal Circuit’s appellate jurisdiction.55 Thus, if, as in Atari, a suit brought before
a federal district court included both a claim of copyright infringement and a claim
of patent infringement, the Federal Circuit would have appellate jurisdiction over
both claims.56 Likewise, even if a suit brought in federal court asserted claims both
under state law—e.g., tort law—and federal patent law, the Federal Circuit would
have appellate jurisdiction.57
Yet, as will be discussed in the next section, despite determining that it had
jurisdiction over entire “cases” and not merely “patent issues,” the Federal Circuit
surprisingly concluded that it should apply the regional circuit’s precedent in some
instances.
C. The Federal Circuit’s Adoption of Its Choice-of-Law Rule
In the early days of the Federal Circuit’s existence, the court was confronted
with determining which law it should apply, both because of its recent creation and
because of its unique jurisdictional grant. Initially, the court concluded that it should
adopt, as binding precedent, the law of its predecessors, the Court of Claims and the
49

Atari, 747 F.2d at 1425.
Atari apparently sought to transfer the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631. See id.
at 1427.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 1426.
53
Id. at 1429–30.
54
Id. at 1429–31; id. at 1433 (“In creating this court’s jurisdiction, Congress had
presented to it two choices: (a) granting this court appellate jurisdiction over only the patent
issues in a case (‘issue jurisdiction’); or (b) granting this court appellate jurisdiction over the
entire case (‘arising under’ jurisdiction). Congress specifically and unequivocally rejected
the former and chose the latter.” (internal footnote omitted)); id. at 1435 (discussing “issue
jurisdiction”).
55
Id. at 1430.
56
See id.
57
See Abbott Labs. v. Brennan, 952 F.2d 1346, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (concluding the
court had appellate jurisdiction over a case that no longer contained an issue of patent law
but contained an issue of state tort law).
50

2020]

FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S CHOICE-OF-LAW RULE

485

Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.58 However, in later decisions, the court
considered or applied the law of the regional circuit in which the case originated.59
The rationale for this practice, however, was not always clear.60 But, in at least one
case, the court expressed a concern regarding issues the court described as “purely
procedural” and the challenge that would arguably be presented to the various
district courts if they had to apply regional circuit procedural law to the bulk of their
cases but Federal Circuit procedural precedent to patent cases.61
1. Procedural Law
Despite this occasional preoccupation with the appropriate precedent to apply,
the Federal Circuit did not extensively consider the issue until its 1984 decision in
Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Manufacturing Co.62 The issue presented in
Panduit was whether to disqualify a party’s counsel.63 Before addressing the
substance of the issue, the court noted that it had to decide the “choice of law
question.”64 The choice-of-law issue the court had in mind was not the typical
choice-of-law issue—i.e., a horizontal choice among two or more states or nations
as to which sovereign’s law should be applied, which is generally resolved by
conducting a comparative analysis of the sovereigns’ laws and weighing the interests
58

See South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370–71 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc).
See, e.g., American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1366–
67 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (applying Ninth Circuit law); W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Int’l Med.
Prosthetics Research Assocs., Inc., 745 F.2d 1463, 1465–67 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (applying Ninth
Circuit law); In re Int’l Med. Prosthetics Research Assocs., Inc., 739 F.2d 618, 620 (Fed.
Cir. 1984) (applying Ninth Circuit law).
60
See American Hoist, 725 F.2d at 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (considering, without
explanation, the contours of the law of the Ninth Circuit, in which the case originated, in
deciding issue of antitrust law).
61
Int’l Med. Prosthetics Research Assocs., 739 F.2d at 620 (“Dealing daily with such
procedural questions in all types of cases, a district court cannot and should not be asked to
answer them one way when the appeal on the merits will go to the regional circuit in which
the district court is located and in a different way when the appeal will come to this circuit.”).
62
744 F.2d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
63
Id. at 1567–71. A preliminary issue presented to the Federal Circuit was whether the
district court’s order disqualifying defendant’s counsel was appealable—and therefore
whether the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction over the appeal—in the first place. Id. at 1571.
The Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final decisions of the district
court, 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2018), and interlocutory orders that are appealable as of right,
id. § 1292(a), (c). A decision disqualifying counsel, however, is not one of the enumerated
interlocutory orders that are appealable as of right. Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit noted
that one of its predecessors, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, had concluded that an
order granting a motion to disqualify counsel is an immediately appealable decision and
concluded that such orders would similarly be immediately appealable to it. Panduit Corp v.
All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564,1571–72 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
64
Panduit, 744 F.2d at 1572–73.
59
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of each in applying their own law and adjudicating the claims at issue.65 Rather, the
choice-of-law issue, as the Federal Circuit described it (and continues to describe
it), is a choice between the law of the regional circuit court in which the case
originated and the law of the Federal Circuit.66
The purported “choice” arose, the Federal Circuit reasoned, from the court’s
unique jurisdictional grant. Unlike the jurisdiction of the other twelve U.S. Courts
of Appeals, the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction is defined substantively, rather than
geographically.67 This unique jurisdictional grant, the Federal Circuit reasoned,
creates a special challenge for practitioners and district courts.68 District courts
presiding over patent cases are “bound by the substantive patent law” of the Federal
Circuit.69 But when a case raises non-patent issues, “[t]he requirement to obey the
law of its circuit causes practitioners and judges, in general, . . . to follow the
‘general’ laws as set forth by their regional circuit court.”70 This “obedience” created
a problem “possibly unforeseen by Congress.”71 Specifically, “[t]hat problem is
which law must a district court apply in matters that are procedural in nature such
as the attorney disqualification question.”72 If the case did not raise patent issues, the
district court would be bound to apply the procedural law of the regional circuit
65

See Allstate Ins. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 307–08 (1981) (recognizing “that a set of
facts giving rise to a lawsuit, or a particular issue within a lawsuit, may justify, in
constitutional terms, application of the law of more than one jurisdiction” and, as a result,
“the forum State may have to select one law from among the laws of several jurisdictions
having some contact with the controversy” (citing Watson v. Emp’rs Liab. Assurance Corp.,
348 U.S. 66, 72–73 (1954))).
66
Panduit, 744 F.2d at 1573.
67
See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2018) (“The courts of appeals (other than the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final
decisions of the district courts of the United States, the United States District Court for the
District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin
Islands, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.”); see also id.
§ 1294(1) (“Except as provided in sections 1292(c) [Federal Circuit jurisdiction over
interlocutory appeals from patent cases in the federal district courts], 1292(d) [Federal
Circuit jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals from the International Trade Commission],
and 1295 [exclusive Federal Court appellate jurisdiction], appeals from reviewable decisions
of the district and territorial courts shall be taken to the courts of appeals as follows: (1) From
a district court of the United States to the court of appeals for the circuit embracing the
district.”).
68
Panduit, 744 F.2d at 1573.
69
Id. (“Since a district court is bound by the law of its circuit, a district court exercising
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1338 is bound by the substantive patent law of this
circuit. The requirement to obey the law of its circuit causes practitioners and district judges,
in general, to follow the substantive patent law as set forth by this court in ‘patent’
cases . . . .”).
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id. (emphasis added).
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court.73 But where the case also raises issues of patent law, the case is instead
appealable to the Federal Circuit, and the district court would be bound to apply the
procedural law of the Federal Circuit.74 The court explained that “[s]uch bifurcated
decision-making”—presumably with respect to procedural law—“is not only
contrary to the spirit of our enabling legislation but also the goal of the federal
judicial system to minimize confusion and conflicts.”75
The Federal Circuit’s enabling statute did not provide the court with any
guidance with respect to this “choice” of law issue. However, the court considered
the legislative history of that statute. Congress’s interest in creating uniformity in
patent law,76 together with “Congress’s abhorrence of conflicts and confusion in the
judicial system”77 and the practical challenge posed to practitioners and district court
judges,78 lead the Federal Circuit to “rule, as a matter of policy, that the Federal
Circuit shall review procedural matters, that are not unique to patent issues, under
the law of the particular regional circuit court where appeals from the district court
would normally lie.”79 Moreover, in instances in which the relevant regional circuit
has not addressed the particular procedural issue before the Federal Circuit, the court
seeks to “predict how that regional circuit would have decided the issue in light of
the decisions of that circuit’s various district courts, [and] public policy”80—a
process that, as other commentators have noted,81 strikingly resembles the
methodology federal courts undertake to interpret and apply state substantive law
consistent with Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins82 and its progeny. In subsequent
cases, the Federal Circuit has described its practice as a “rule of deference.”83
73

See id.
See id.
75
Id. (internal citations omitted).
76
Id. at 1573–74.
77
Id. at 1574.
78
See id. (“[P]ractitioners within the jurisdiction of a particular regional circuit court
should not be required to practice law and to counsel clients in light of two different sets of
law for an identical issue due to the different routes of appeal. An equal, if not more
important, consideration is that district judges also should not be required to decide cases in
this fashion.”).
79
Id. at 1574–75 (emphasis added).
80
Id. at 1575; see also Badalamenti v. Dunham’s, Inc., 896 F.2d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (“When the regional circuit court has spoken on a legal issue, we must apply the law
as stated; if the regional circuit court has not spoken, we must predict how that court would
decide the issue in light of such criteria as the decisions of that circuit’s district courts, other
circuits’ decisions, and public policy.” (citing Panduit, 744 F.2d at 1574–75)).
81
See generally Schaffner, supra note 17; see also Karol, supra note 16, at 4 (describing
it as a “‘reverse’ Erie analysis”).
82
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
83
Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 457 F.3d 1279, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Biodex
Corp. v. Loredan Biomedical, Inc., 946 F.2d 850, 856 (Fed. Cir. 1991); cf. Beverly Hills Fan
Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (concluding with respect
to issue of personal jurisdiction that the Federal Circuit “owe[s] no special deference to
74
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2. Substantive Law
A little more than six weeks after Panduit, the Federal Circuit adopted a similar
policy with respect to non-patent substantive law issues in Atari, Inc. v. JS & A
Group, Inc.84 Recall that, in Atari, the Federal Circuit concluded that its appellate
jurisdiction extended to entire “cases,” not just “patent issues.”85 And therefore, the
court concluded, it had appellate jurisdiction over a preliminary injunction
pertaining to the plaintiff’s copyright claim that was joined with its patent claim.86
Nonetheless, the court concluded that it should apply Seventh Circuit law in
reviewing the district court’s injunctive order.87 The court reviewed a number of its
earlier decisions, including Panduit, and concluded, “The freedom of the district
courts to follow the guidance of their particular circuits in all but the substantive law
fields assigned exclusively to this court is recognized in the foregoing opinions and
in this case.”88 It explained, “It would be at best unfair to hold in this case that the
district court, at risk of error, should have ‘served two masters’, or that it should
have looked, Janus-like, in two directions in its conduct of that judicial process.”89
The court was concerned that, if it required the district court to apply the law of more
than one court of appeals, it would be saddling the district courts with a sort of
duality, like Janus, the Roman god with two faces, one looking to the past, the other
to the future (however inaccurate the analogy).
Atari, therefore, gave birth to the second prong of the Federal Circuit’s
policy90—i.e., that, in general, the Federal Circuit will defer to the law of the court
of appeals from which a case originated on non-patent substantive issues. Panduit
and Atari together, then, established the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule.91
regional circuit law” (citing Biodex, 946 F.2d at 855–59)).
84
747 F.2d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
85
Id. at 1430, 1433–36; see also supra notes 46–56, and accompanying text.
86
Id. at 1429–35.
87
Id. at 1438–40.
88
Id. at 1439 (emphasis added).
89
Id.
90
The Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule as it relates to non-patent substantive law is
beyond the scope of this Article.
91
The Federal Circuit does not only have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent
cases. The Federal Circuit additionally has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over claims
arising under the “Little Tucker Act,” 28 U.S.C. § 1346, which waives United States
sovereign immunity and creates causes of action against the United States for various types
of harms. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(2). The Little Tucker Act specifically creates a cause of
action for any claim against the United States that does not exceed $10,000. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346 (2018) (providing for concurrent jurisdiction in federal district courts and United
States Court of Federal Claims for claims not exceeding $10,000).
As with patent claims, Little Tucker Act claims can originate in any federal district
court because the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction is based on subject matter, not geography.
Little Tucker Act claims may also originate in the United States Court of Federal Claims,
with which the federal district courts have concurrent jurisdiction. See id.
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***
Since Panduit and Atari, the Federal Circuit has referred to its choice-of-law
rule in dozens of cases.92 In many cases, the Federal Circuit has simply restated its
choice-of-law rule without any further explication as to how it was discerning the
line between “procedure” on the one hand, and “substance” on the other.93 In at least
a couple of cases, the court acknowledged the challenge and attempted to articulate
a rule that embodied the complexity of the relationship between substance and
procedure. 94 But the choice-of-law rule that emerged from these cases is incoherent
and practically unworkable.
For example, in Biodex Corp. v. Loredan Biomedical, Inc.,95 a case decided in
1991, the Federal Circuit acknowledged that the Panduit “test” had been
inconsistently articulated in the short six years since Panduit was decided.96 The
The Federal Circuit initially adopted its choice-of-law rule only with respect to cases
arising under the patent laws. See Panduit, 744 F.2d at 1575 n.15 (“This ruling may be
applicable to our review of district court decisions which do not involve patent claims. For
example, cases involving the ‘Little Tucker Act.’ We need not and do not decide this
question.” (internal citations omitted)). Subsequently, the court adopted the same rule with
respect to cases arising under the Little Tucker Act. See Russell v. United States, 661 F.3d
1371, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“The question regarding whether and under what circumstances
Mr. Russell can continue to represent putative class members even after his personal claim
has become moot is a procedural question that is not unique to cases arising under the Little
Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2). We therefore apply the law of the regional circuit—in
this case the Ninth Circuit—to that question.”). A full consideration of the Federal Circuit’s
choice-of-law rule with respect to the Little Tucker Act claims is beyond the scope of this
Article.
92
See, e.g., Abbvie Deutschland GmbH & Co. v. Janssen Biotech, Inc., 759 F.3d 1285,
1295 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Monsanto Co. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 748 F.3d 1189,
1196 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Sulzer Textil A.G. v. Picanol N.V., 358 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir.
2004); Manildra Milling Corp. v. Ogilvie Mills, Inc., 76 F.3d 1178, 1181 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
93
See, e.g., Abbvie Deutschland GmbH, 759 F.3d at 1295; Monsanto, 748 F.3d at 1196;
Sulzer Textil, 358 F.3d at 1363; Manildra Milling Corp., 76 F.3d at 1181.
94
See, e.g., Manildra Milling Corp., 76 F.3d at 1181–82 (explaining that deference to
circuit law is inappropriate when interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Biodex
Corp. v. Loredan Biomedical, Inc., 946 F.2d 850, 855–59 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (explained infra).
95
946 F.2d 850 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
96
Id. at 854–55 (“[O]ur case law has not been clear on whether we should or must defer
to the law of the regional circuit on this kind of issue.”); id. at 856 (“This test has been
variously and inconstantly phrased.”). The court then reviewed some of its earlier
articulations of the test:
The court has recently stated the relevant test as whether the issue concerns a
‘subject which is not unique to patent law,’ or which is ‘not specific to our
statutory jurisdiction,’ in which event we have deferred. Alternatively, we have
looked to whether the procedural issue may be ‘related’ to ‘substantive matters
unique to the Federal Circuit’ and thus committed to our law. Furthermore, no
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court additionally noted that language in Panduit “phrased the relevant line of
demarcation in fluid language, noting that the resolution of the issue of deference in
particular cases would depend on whether the procedural matter should ‘pertain to’
or be ‘related to patent issues [such that] they have a direct bearing on the
outcome.’”97
Biodex did not take this as an invitation to draw the line more clearly. Nor did
the court attempt to outline a more workable approach. Instead, it described what
amounts to a commitment to resolve patent controversies on a case-by-case basis:
“Panduit did not engrave a fixed meaning to the terms ‘unique to,’ ‘related to,’ or
‘pertain[ing] to,’ our exclusive statutory subject matter jurisdiction, but instead
recognized that each case must be decided by reference to the core policy of not
creating unnecessary conflicts and confusion in procedural matters.”98 Biodex,
notably, does not consider the court’s mandate to create uniformity in patent law and
how its decision would (or would not) further that goal.
The impracticality and incoherence of the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule
would again become apparent in the court’s 1996 decision, Manildra Milling Corp.
v. Ogilvie Mills, Inc.99 The Manildra court explained that it considers “several
factors,” including whether there is a consensus among the regional circuits, the need
to promote uniformity in patent law, and the “nature of the legal issue involved.”100
In general, when there is uniformity among the regional circuits, the Federal Circuit
has “conformed” its law to that of the other circuit courts.101 In addition, the court
explained that, generally, where the “nature” of the “issue involves an interpretation
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” it defers to the regional circuit.102 The
reason offered was “that such rules are integral to the routine conduct of trials, and
matter how phrased, this particular test has not always ended our inquiry. We have
considered, secondarily, whether ‘most cases involving the issue will come on
appeal to this court,’ thereby putting us in a ‘good position to create a uniform
body of federal law’ on the issue.
Id. at 856 (citations omitted).
97
Id. at 857 (quoting Panduit, 744 F.2d at 1575 n.14 (alteration in original)). The
Panduit footnote states in full:
This policy is not inconsistent with our prior decisions in which procedural
matters that do pertain to patent issues, such as whether proof of non-experimental
use is necessary to establish a prima facie defense of an on-sale bar, must conform
to Federal Circuit law. Since those procedural matters are related to patent issues,
they have a direct bearing on the outcome of those determinations.
Panduit, 744 F.2d at 1575 n.14 (citations omitted).
98
Biodex, 946 F.2d at 857.
99
76 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
100
Id. at 1181.
101
Id.
102
Id. at 1181–82.
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that practitioners and judges should be free to conduct litigation according to the
rules that ordinarily apply to them.”103
So, after Manildra, what is there? A multi-factored balancing test, that favors,
but is not bounded by, uniformity with the regional circuits, especially where
interpretation of a Federal Rule is involved, but that is also mindful of uniformity in
patent trials and whether the procedural issue “relates to” or “pertains to” patent law,
as well as the particular circumstances of the case at hand. How are district court
judges, who must decide these sorts of issues in the first instance, supposed to apply
this test? Unlike the court’s opinions in Panduit and Atari, which were concerned
with the ease with which a district court could administer the law in the first instance,
Manildra does not appear at all concerned with the administrability of the law.
III. A BALANCED CONSIDERATION OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S
CHOICE-OF-LAW RULE
In adopting its choice-of-law rule, the Federal Circuit considered a number of
policy objectives reflected in the legislative history of the court’s enabling statute.104
Those policy objectives include developing patent law in a uniform manner,
discouraging forum shopping between the Federal Circuit and the regional circuit
courts, and avoiding specialization of the Federal Circuit.105 In addition, the court
was concerned with the rule’s administrability by the district courts.106 But the
court’s analysis neither thoroughly considered the choice-of-law rule’s effects on
those objectives nor fully appreciated the problems the rule might present.
This Part aims to correct for these oversights by undertaking a thorough and
balanced consideration of the court’s choice-of-law rule. Because the rule is
articulated in terms of, and relies on, the substance-procedure dichotomy, the
discussion begins by considering how the dichotomy affects the court’s application
of its choice-of-law rule. The discussion then considers how the rule affects the
court’s ability to develop and apply patent law in a uniform manner. These two
concepts—the substance-procedure dichotomy and the uniformity of law—dovetail
to suggest a third manner in which to evaluate the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law
rule: the extent to which the rule enables the court to treat substantively similar cases
procedurally differently, and to do so in a non-transparent manner. The discussion
then evaluates the court’s rule for its effects on forum shopping, the specialization
of the Federal Circuit, and, finally, the administrability of the chosen rule.

103
Id. at 1182. Despite the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule, the court ultimately
declined to follow the law of the regional circuit, i.e., the Tenth Circuit. See id.
104
The Federal Circuit’s enabling statute is the Federal Courts Improvement Act
(FCIA) of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982).
105
See supra Section II.A.
106
See supra Section II.C(1), (2) (discussing the court’s rationale in Panduit and Atari).
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A. The Substance-Procedure Dichotomy
The court’s choice-of-law rule requires the court to defer to the regional circuit
courts on issues of procedural law but not on issues of substantive patent law. Thus,
the court’s rule necessarily draws a line between “procedural law,” on the one hand,
and “substantive law,” on the other. But as Biodex and Manildra reveal, drawing
that line is not a simple task. Drawing such a line importantly presumes that there is
a distinction between the two and is therefore dependent on the dichotomy between
substance and procedure. But as scholars, commentators,107 and the Supreme
Court108 have noted, the line between procedure and substance is a difficult one to
draw.
Nonetheless, one common way of drawing the line between law that is
procedural versus law that is substantive is by identifying the type of conduct it
regulates. Procedural law regulates litigation conduct and is “designed to make the
process of litigation a fair and efficient mechanism for the resolution of disputes.”109
Substantive law, in contrast, regulates primary conduct.110
107
See, e.g., Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror,” 108
COLUM. L. REV. 1013, 1018–20 (2008); John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87
HARV. L. REV. 693, 724 (1974) (“We were all brought up on sophisticated talk about the
fluidity of the line between substance and procedure. But the realization that the terms carry
no monolithic meaning at once appropriate to all contexts in which courts have seen fit to
employ them need not imply that they can have no meaning at all.” (internal footnotes
omitted)); Tobias Barrington Wolff, Managerial Judging and Substantive Law, 90 WASH.
U. L. REV. 1027, 1028 (2013) (“When a federal judge engages in heavy-handed case
management or makes decisions about the proper bounds of a complex proceeding, it is not
just the norms of judging but also the applicable liability policies that must guide her in that
endeavor.”); Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed
Opportunities of Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 51 (2010) (“Even Congress has
learned the power of procedure and knows how to pursue or mask substantive aims in
procedural dress.”); Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a
Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718 passim (1975) (discussing the complex relationship
between substance and procedure).
108
Because the Erie doctrine importantly relies on the substance-procedure dichotomy,
it is perhaps not surprising that the Supreme Court has noted the difficulty in drawing the
line between the two in cases articulating and construing that doctrine. See, e.g., Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965) (“The line between ‘substance’ and ‘procedure’ shifts as
the legal context changes.”); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 92 (1938) (Reed, J.,
concurring) (“The line between procedural and substantive law is hazy . . . .” (citing
Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1 (1825))).
109
Ely, supra note 107, at 724 (internal footnotes omitted); cf. Martinez, supra note
107, at 1021 (“By ‘process’ or ‘procedure,’ I mean not only questions of procedure within
courts and court like tribunals, but also broader questions about how to allocate the authority
to make and apply law among different government actors, including judges, legislators, and
executive officials.”).
110
See Ely, supra note 107, at 725 (noting that “in attempting to give content to the
notion of substance, the literature has focused on those rules of law which characteristically

2020]

FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S CHOICE-OF-LAW RULE

493

These definitions roughly track those offered by the Federal Circuit in its
Panduit decision. The court described procedure as “the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly
administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them.”111 And it
defined substantive law as “relat[ing] to rights and duties which give rise to a cause
of action.”112
But in actuality, there is a sort of “fluidity of the line between substance and
procedure.”113 “Far from being distinct, substance and procedure are deeply
intertwined.”114 Some procedural rules and doctrines are aimed at advancing
substantive ends.115 But even some that are arguably “procedural,” because they
regulate litigation conduct and are aimed at the accurate and efficient application of
the antecedent legal regime, necessitate, or at least permit, application in a manner
that reflects the objectives of the substantive law. These sorts of issues are essentially
compound; they are composed of both a procedural element and a substantive
element.
Consider, for example, the law regulating a transfer of venue. Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404, the district court may transfer a case from a proper venue116 to “any other
and reasonably affect people’s conduct at the state of primary private activity,” but adding
“the fostering and protection of certain states of mind” and “immunizing laws” to the
definition of “substantive” as well (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Cover, supra
note 107, at 721–22 (“The distinction [between procedure and substance] I have in mind is
the familiar one between that which controls the conduct of litigation and that which controls
social conduct outside the courtroom.”); Martinez, supra note 107, at 1020–21 (“[B]y
‘substance’ I mean rules that control the primary conduct of human beings outside the
litigation or lawmaking process.”).
111
Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1574 n.12 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (per curiam). The Federal Circuit quoted Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14
(1941) for this definition. But as Professor Rochelle Dreyfuss has pointed out in her criticism
of the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule, Sibbach—and along with it, Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and its progeny—are aimed at serving different ends than the
Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule. See Dreyfuss, A Case Study, supra note 16, at 39. Both
the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule and the Erie doctrine are concerned with
“developing rules that prevent forum shopping.” Id. But the Erie doctrine is additionally
concerned with limiting the federal government’s ability to intrude on the prerogatives of the
states. See id. And, consequently, the Erie doctrine has attempted to draw the line between
substance and procedure in a manner that reflects these objectives. See id. The methodology
that Sibbach and the Erie doctrine gave birth to are therefore not necessarily relevant. See id.
That said, since its decision in Panduit, the Federal Circuit has cited to neither Sibbach nor
Panduit for this same proposition.
112
Panduit, 744 F.2d at 1574 n.12.
113
Ely, supra note 107, at 724.
114
Martinez, supra note 107, at 1019.
115
See, e.g., id.
116
If venue is improper, then 28 U.S.C. § 1406 controls, and a district court must
dismiss the case or transfer it to a district or division where the case could have been brought
in the first place.
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district or division where it might have been brought” if doing so is convenient for
the parties and non-party witnesses and is “in the interest of justice.” Section 1404
may be characterized as “procedural” in that it, together with the main venue statute,
28 U.S.C. § 1391, is meant to control the conduct of litigation. Specifically, together
they control the venue in which a case may be brought and to which it may be
transferred.
Courts considering a motion for transfer generally engage in a two-step
analysis. First, consistent with § 1404(a), they consider whether the venue to which
the moving party wants to transfer the action is one in which the action could have
been brought in the first instance—i.e., courts consider whether the transferee court
has personal jurisdiction over the defendant and subject matter jurisdiction over the
action, as well as whether venue would have been proper.117 Second, they engage in
a multi-factor balancing test that ultimately aims to consider whether transferring is
convenient for the parties and non-party witnesses, as well as whether transferring
serves the public interest.118
This analysis might seem like a fairly straight-forward balancing test that is
divorced from issues of patent law, or any substantive law for that matter. But
judgments about substantive law issues underlie the analysis.119 In determining
whether transferring is inconvenient for non-party witnesses, courts will consider
whether transferring the action will result in a witness being outside the subpoena
power of the court, thereby effectively rendering the witness unavailable for trial.120
But considering the convenience (or inconvenience, as the case may be) to a nonparty witness necessarily raises the issue of whether the proposed witness is relevant
to the claims at issue in the first place, or whether, alternatively, she was cherrypicked merely for her relative distance to the transferee courthouse.
For example, consider a case in which a plaintiff brings suit in Delaware for
patent infringement. Early in the case, the defendant, relying on § 1404, seeks to
transfer the case to the Northern District of California.121 In support of its motion to
transfer, the defendant claims that the transferee venue would be more convenient
117

See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2018).
15 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3847 (4th ed. 2019).
119
Cf. Martinez, supra note 107, at 1041 n.144 (noting that procedural rules, such as
those relating to choice of venue, can have substantive effects or be motivated by substantive
concerns).
120
See FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c) (providing in part that a subpoena can command a nonparty to attend trial if the trial is within 100 miles from where the non-party resides, is
employed, or regularly transacts business).
121
Even though plaintiffs make the initial decision regarding in which forum to file
their actions, both plaintiffs and defendants are permitted to move to transfer venue pursuant
to section 1404(a). See generally Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990) (considering
whether to apply law of the state of transferor court or transferee court where plaintiff, rather
than defendant, moved for transfer). Nonetheless, for ease of discussion, it is assumed unless
otherwise noted that the defendant is the moving party.
118
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because the defendant’s proposed non-party witnesses reside in the Northern District
of California. The non-party witnesses identified by the defendant are inventors of
prior arts that arguably establish that the patent-in-suit was anticipated or is obvious.
The weight a court should accord the inconvenience to these proposed witnesses
should almost certainly turn on the court’s assessment of the relevancy of the prior
art to the defendant’s patent invalidity defense. Otherwise, this part of the transfer
analysis would be highly vulnerable to manipulation and effectively useless. All the
defendant would need to do is propose inventors outside the court’s subpoena power
as witnesses.
And yet, in reviewing district court decisions to grant or deny motions to
transfer, the Federal Circuit elides the substantive patent law issue, having already
characterized it as a “procedural” issue. Consider In re Apple Inc.,122 in which the
Federal Circuit accepted, without further examination or consideration, defendant
Apple’s argument that the transferee forum was more convenient to its potential
third-party witnesses.123 The defendant, Apple, sought to transfer the plaintiff’s
patent infringement suit from the Eastern District of Texas to the Northern District
of California, where “several prospective non-party witnesses” resided, including
witnesses that had “relevant and material information.”124 The district court denied
Apple’s motion to transfer.125 With respect to the convenience of the witnesses, the
district court noted that neither Apple nor the plaintiff “provide[d] significant detail
as to the information possessed by the identified witnesses, and neither suggest[ed]
that they would require all the witnesses identified to actually attend trial.”126 Apple
petitioned the Federal Circuit for a writ of mandamus.127 The Federal Circuit granted
122

In re Apple, Inc., 581 Fed. Appx. 886 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Id. at 889.
124
Id. at 887.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id. at 886. A defendant whose motion to transfer pursuant to § 1404(a) has been
denied has a few choices with respect to having the district court’s decision reviewed. A
defendant can either wait for a final judgment and appeal the district court’s transfer decision
with any other appealable issues to the appropriate appellate court or seek interlocutory
appellate review. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 118, at § 3855. The most popular
method of interlocutory review is for the defendant to seek a writ of mandamus or of
prohibition from the appropriate appellate court, directing the district court to vacate its
initial order and enter a new order transferring the case. See id.
Where the case does not raise issues of patent law, the appellate court can be different
depending on the district court’s determination and the route taken by the defendant. Where
the district court grants the motion to transfer, if the defendant waits for a final judgment, the
issue is appealed to the circuit court that embraces the transferee court. See id. § 3901. But
if the defendant instead seeks a writ of mandamus or prohibition (or any other form of
interlocutory review), defendant must petition the appellate court that embraces the
transferor court. See id. § 3855; see also id. § 3935 n.14. In contrast, where the district court
denies the motion to transfer, the appellate court is the same, regardless of whether defendant
waits for a final judgment or seeks a writ of mandamus. See id. § 3855.
123
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the petition, concluding that the district court erred for a variety of reasons, including
because “the district court failed to give proper weight to the convenience of the
witnesses factor.”128 Judge Bryson, however, dissented, in part, because Apple failed
to establish how its third-party witnesses “would be important to the issues at
trial.”129
The crux of the disagreement between the majority and the dissent is the extent
to which the court should do a searching analysis of the relevancy of the parties’
witnesses. The majority confined its analysis to a review of the balancing of some
evidence against other evidence.130 But the majority took at face value the relative
weight each piece of evidence should be accorded.131 In doing so, the majority
declined to make an independent judgment about the evidence’s importance to the
underlying patent issue.132 The dissent, in contrast, reviewed both the balancing and
relative weight of the evidence.133 Ultimately, the majority’s approach reveals a
missed opportunity for the Federal Circuit to speak on an issue of substantive patent
law clearly before it.134
But the disagreement between the majority and the dissent also reveals the
tenuousness of the substance-procedure dichotomy. A law like the venue transfer
statute is articulated in terms that make no reference to the substantive law. It is
therefore seemingly “procedural.” Nonetheless, a determination of whether to grant
a party’s motion to transfer under the statute implicates considerations of the
antecedent substantive law—in the case of Apple, specifically, patent law. It is
therefore difficult to fully divorce the procedural issues from the substantive ones.
Moreover, the majority and dissent’s disagreement reveals one of the dangers
of the substance-procedure dichotomy. Rather than engaging in a first-order debate
about the underlying substantive issue, decisionmakers will instead fix their
attention on largely procedural debates. Thus, in Apple, the majority’s decision to
But when a case raises an issue of patent law, the appellate court is the same, regardless
of whether the motion is granted or denied and regardless of whether the party waits for a
final judgment or seeks a writ of mandamus. In all instances, the district court’s decision will
be reviewed by the Federal Circuit. See 28 U.S.C. §1295(a)(1) (2018) (providing for Federal
Circuit jurisdiction over final judgments involving issues of patent law); WRIGHT & MILLER,
supra note 118, at § 3903.1 & n.106.
128
Apple, 581 Fed. Appx. at 888.
129
Id. at 891 (Bryson, J., dissenting).
130
Id. at 887–88.
131
Id. at 888–89.
132
Id. at 893 (Bryson, J., dissenting).
133
Id. at 890–93 (Bryson, J., dissenting).
134
One explanation for the majority’s approach might be that, as discussed infra notes
222–224, and accompanying text, the court was primarily concerned with correcting for the
systemic problem created by the fact that the Fifth Circuit and Eastern District of Texas, in
particular, were venues that were hospitable to non-practicing entity patent plaintiffs. Eager
to transfer cases out of the Fifth Circuit, the majority may have therefore been uninterested
in doing a careful inquiry into whether the Eastern District of Texas’s denial of the motion
to transfer was justified.
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grant the writ is seemingly a simple one regarding the weight of the evidence,135 but
the dissent hints at the decision’s underlying substantive content, although it does
not fully expose it.136
To be sure, the danger of substantive law judgments disguised as procedural
ones runs through all legal determinations with a procedural component. But the
Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule amplifies this risk. It adds a layer of complexity
to the procedural issue, which can further obscure the substantive law determination.
In re Barnes & Noble, Inc.,137 discussed in the Introduction, is illustrative.
Barnes & Noble also concerned a defendant’s petition for writ of mandamus
directing transfer of venue.138 The plaintiff, a patentholder, brought suit against
Barnes & Noble in the Western District of Tennessee, where the plaintiff’s Chief
Executive Officer and inventor resided, claiming Barnes & Noble’s popular Nook
device infringed the plaintiff’s patent.139 The plaintiff, importantly, was a nonpracticing entity or, pejoratively, a patent “troll”—i.e., a patentholder that did not
practice its own patents, but merely asserted them against others who arguably
did.140 Barnes & Noble moved to transfer the action from the Western District of
Tennessee to the Northern District of California, “where most of its activities related
to the Nook® take place.”141 But the district court denied Barnes & Noble’s
motion.142 Ultimately, the Federal Circuit denied Barnes & Noble’s petition,
concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying its motion
for transfer.143
The court’s decision, however, was not unanimous. The disagreement between
the majority and the dissent was over what precedent to apply. The majority felt
bound to apply the Federal Circuit’s precedent pertaining to the Sixth Circuit, where
the case originated.144
135

Of course, the same opportunity to make substantive law judgments in the guise of
procedural law determinations exists in the first instance before the district court. The trial
court could have decided that the plaintiff’s infringement claims were relatively strong and
that Apple’s defense, without more evidence, was relatively weak. Not only would such a
determination support a denial of Apple’s motion to transfer, but importantly it would have
enabled the district court to maintain jurisdiction over the case and rule substantively on the
claims at a later time. Cf. Brian J. Love & James Yoon, Predictably Expensive: A Critical
Look at Patent Litigation in the Eastern District of Texas, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 16
(2017) (noting that the Eastern District of Texas is less likely to grant motions to transfer).
136
A related, subsidiary issue is that, by making a seemingly neutral “procedural”
determination, judges can obscure value judgments about the underlying substantive legal
issue.
137
743 F.3d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
138
Id. at 1383.
139
Id. at 1382.
140
Id. at 1384.
141
Id. at 1382.
142
Id.
143
Id. at 1383.
144
See id. at 1383–84.
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In contrast, Judge Newman, dissenting, would have applied Federal Circuit
precedent, which in turn had arguably applied the law of the Fifth Circuit.145 The
law of the Sixth Circuit and Fifth Circuit differed in the quantum of showing the
defendant had to make in order to overcome the plaintiff’s initial choice of venue.146
The Fifth Circuit standard was an easier standard to meet; it simply required that the
balance of factors outweigh plaintiff’s initial choice of venue.147 The Sixth Circuit,
in contrast, required that the balance of factors “substantially” outweigh the
plaintiff’s choice of venue.148 But the difference in the precedent was not merely in
the quantum of showing. In Judge Newman’s view, there was a difference in how
much weight to accord the plaintiff’s initial choice of venue that was tethered to a
substantive issue of patent law but untethered to the particular balancing test of the
relevant circuit court.149 The Federal Circuit’s application of Fifth Circuit precedent,
Judge Newman noted, accorded the plaintiff’s choice of venue “minimal deference”
when the plaintiff importantly was a non-practicing entity.150 In contrast, no Sixth
Circuit precedent had considered how a non-practicing-entity plaintiff affected the
balancing test to be applied under a § 1404(a) transfer analysis.151 But in Judge
Newman’s opinion, the same “minimal deference” given to the plaintiff’s choice of
forum in the prior cases appealed from the Fifth Circuit was justified in a case
appealed from the Sixth Circuit.152 And thus, regardless of whether the defendant’s
showing had to merely outweigh (Fifth Circuit) or rather “substantially” outweigh
(Sixth Circuit) plaintiff’s choice of venue, the defendant had made the necessary
showing because of how little deference the plaintiff’s choice should be accorded.153
On the surface—at least as the majority describes it—the disagreement between
the majority and the dissent appears to be simply about what precedent is controlling.
But there may be a number of fundamental disagreements driving the majority’s and
dissent’s positions.
One possibility is that the underlying disagreement is ultimately about
substantive patent law—specifically, about whether the rights and remedies of nonpracticing entities are, or ought to be, less extensive than those of practicing
patentholders and whether patent law doctrines and remedies should accordingly be
calibrated to reflect those differences.154 The dissent’s opinion suggests that such a
145

See id. at 1385 (Newman, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1383–84.
Id. at 1385.
147
Id.
148
See id. at 1384 (“Unlike the Sixth Circuit, . . . the Fifth Circuit has expressly held
that . . . district courts err when they require that § 1404(a) factors ‘must substantially
outweigh the plaintiff’s choice of venue.’” (quoting In re Volkswagen of America, Inc., 545
F.3d 304, 314 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc))).
149
Id. at 1385.
150
Id.
151
See id. at 1384.
152
See id. at 1385.
153
See id.
154
See, e.g., John M. Golden, Patent Privateers: Private Enforcement’s Historical
146
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calibration is warranted, whereas the majority’s opinion is consistent with a view
that the rights and remedies of the two types of patentholders are on par with each
other.
Another possibility is that they disagree about whether it is justified to treat
cases from the Fifth and Sixth Circuits differently, and if so, the justification for that
disparate treatment. The majority’s opinion suggests that it appears to believe the
disparate treatment is justified by the choice-of-law rule.155 In contrast, the dissent’s
opinion suggests that it believes the disparate treatment is not justified because the
patent-specific application of the venue transfer statute should be the same,
regardless of the court of appeals in which the case originated.156
It is also possible that the disagreement between the majority and the dissent
extends to the very nature of the disagreement itself. They disagree about what they
disagree about. The majority may view the disagreement as about the applicability
of the choice-of-law rule, while the dissent may view the disagreement as about the
appropriateness of crafting patent-specific procedural law.
The reality is that it is hard to precisely pin down their respective positions.
(Indeed, I suggest in Section III.C, below, that the majority may have an entirely
different motivation for its disparate treatment of cases from the Fifth and Sixth
Circuits that is not at all apparent from the opinion.) Rather than directly and
transparently consider how the rights and remedies afforded non-practicing entities
supports or undermines the overarching objectives of the patent laws, the majority
and dissent instead focus their discussion on the relevant precedent and controlling
standard of an arguably procedural law. Thus, the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law
rule ensnares the court in the substance-procedure dichotomy’s difficult, if not
unachievable, task of parsing substance from procedure. And, perhaps more
importantly, it creates the same danger of obscuring substantive law determinations.

Survivors, 26 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 545, 592 (2013) (contending that patent policy debate
benefits from considering non-practicing entities as private enforcers, rather than vilified
“patent trolls,” because such a characterization reveals nature of patent law as private
enforcement regime); Oskar Liivak & Eduardo M. Peñalver, The Right Not to Use in
Property and Patent Law, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1437, 1481–83 (2013) (arguing that
enforcing unused patents against independent inventors introduces a variety of harms “while
generating few apparent offsetting benefits”); Robert P. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls:
Innovation, Rent-Seeking, and Patent Law, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583, 1609–14 (2009)
(arguing that courts curtail rent-seeking by “non-innovating patent owners”); Henry E.
Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2083, 2125–
27 (2009) (warning of risks to practicing entities posed by curtailing the right of nonpracticing entities to get injunctions); cf. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388,
396–97 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (suggesting that whether a patentholder should be
awarded a permanent injunction could turn on whether it is a non-practicing entity).
155
Barnes & Noble, 743 F.3d at 1383–84.
156
Id. at 1384–85 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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B. Uniformity of Patent Law
The shortcomings of the substance-procedure dichotomy—translated into risks
and weaknesses of the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule—have effects on the
uniformity of patent law. Recall that one of the factors the Federal Circuit considered
in adopting its choice-of-law rule was the rule’s effect on the court’s ability to
develop substantive patent law in a uniform manner, consistent with congressional
intent.157 The Federal Circuit’s jurisdictional statute, however, is completely silent
with respect to what law the Federal Circuit should apply,158 as is the legislative
history.159
Consistent with the legislative history of the Federal Circuit’s enabling statute,
the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule sought to achieve national (i.e., inter-circuit)
uniformity of substantive patent law, as applied. But given the Federal Circuit’s
choice-of-law rule’s deference to the regional circuits on issues of “procedural” law,
“substantive” uniformity is closely tied up with the soundness of the substanceprocedure dichotomy. If legal issues, as well as the law relied upon to resolve those
issues, lend themselves to easy characterization as “procedural” versus
“substantive,” then uniformity can reasonably be aspired to. But if the distinction
between the two is illusory, then the characterization of an issue as procedural, when,
in fact, it is constituted of both procedural and substantive components, leads the
court down the path of relying on the precedent of the regional circuit courts. When
the procedural laws of those courts are, themselves, in disagreement, that procedural
disuniformity can be translated into substantive disuniformity within the Federal
Circuit. The end result may be that substantive patent law develops in circuitspecific, disparate ways.160
157

See Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1574 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (per curiam) (“This court was created, as contemplated by the Congress, to achieve
uniformity and to reduce uncertainties in [patent law]. This court, thus, has a mandate to
achieve uniformity in patent matters. . . . The possibility of different [procedural]
requirements should be minimized especially where a dispute is totally unrelated to patent
issues and the resolution of that dispute does not impinge on the goal of patent law
uniformity.”).
158
In this respect, the Federal Circuit’s jurisdictional statute is consistent with other
jurisdictional statutes. Compare 28 U.S. § 1295 (2018) (Federal Circuit jurisdiction), with
28 U.S.C. §§ 1330–1389 (jurisdiction of U.S. district courts).
159
See S. REP. NO. 97-275 (1981), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11; H.R. REP.
NO. 97-312 (1981); cf. David Marcus, Trans-Substantivity and the Processes of American
Law, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1191, 1225 & n.138 (2013) [hereinafter Marcus, Processes of
American Law] (noting that Congress “hardly ever specifies whether or how a bill’s
legislative history can be used in interpretation” and providing the Civil Rights Act of 1991
as the only example in which Congress has specified what documents a court may consider).
160
See TechSearch, L.L.C. v. Intel Corp., 286 F.3d 1360, 1376–81 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(applying regional circuit law to the issue of whether the district court may appoint a
technical advisor, even though the use of a technical advisor can affect the substantive
determination insofar as the technical advisor may ultimately be making impermissible
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Barnes & Noble illustrates this very concern. The disagreement between the
majority and the dissent reveals that the application of regional circuit law yields
different outcomes, depending on which circuit law is applied. More importantly, it
reveals that the Federal Circuit’s venue jurisprudence is developing in separate,
regional-circuit-specific silos with no concern for consistency across regional
circuits. The Panduit court recognized that such inconsistencies were a possibility,
noting that the choice-of-law rule it was adopting “could on occasion require this
court to reach disparate results in procedural matters in light of disparate viewpoints
from the regional circuit courts.”161 And in her Barnes & Noble dissent, Judge
Newman criticized the majority’s decision for this very reason. She noted the
reasons for transferring were just as compelling as they had been in the court’s
earlier precedent, and she expressed concern over the internal inconsistency
emerging in the court’s venue cases: “Consistency of judicial ruling is no less
important in procedural and discretionary matters than in questions of substantive
law.”162
But what the Panduit court did not recognize is that these are not merely
disparate results in procedural matters. These are, at the same time, disparate results
in substantive patent law.163 The Federal Circuit’s precedents reviewing cases from
factual determinations and such erroneous determinations are difficult for appellate courts to
detect); id. at 1381–82 (Dyk, J., concurring) (noting the risk a technical advisor may make
impermissible factual determinations and the risk the appellate court will not detect such
errors) (“I am concerned that district court judges may have a tendency to rely on technical
advisors in summary judgment situations to resolve disputed issues of fact. Since we review
the grant of summary judgment without deference, it can be argued that such excessive
reliance would be harmless error. But appellate review is not always perfect, and, as a
practical matter, ‘common sense dictates that the trial judge’s view will carry weight’ even
where our review is de novo.”); see also TechSearch, L.L.C. v. Intel Corp., No. 02-262, 2002
WL 32134118, at 1, 8, 14–20 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 14, 2002), petition for cert. filed (seeking
certiorari, in part, because appointment of technical advisor is not permitted in other courts
of appeals, namely, the Seventh, First, Third, and D.C. Circuits, and will lead to different
results in different circuits) (“The Federal Circuit’s holding directly conflicts . . . with the
purpose for which the Federal Circuit was created: to increase doctrinal stability in the field
of patent law.”); cf. Field, supra note 16, at 663 (noting that the regional circuit courts have
different standards for deciding motions for judgment as a matter of law—some applying a
“liberal standard” and others applying a “strict standard”—which may be outcome
determinative).
161
Panduit, 744 F.2d at 1575.
162
In re Barnes & Noble, Inc., 743 F.3d 1381, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Newman, J.,
dissenting).
163
Indeed, following Barnes & Noble, petitioner, Barnes & Noble, sought rehearing en
banc, and a number of amici filed a brief in support of Barnes & Noble’s petition, arguing
that the Federal Circuit should develop and apply its own law to the issue of venue transfer
to accommodate the specific needs of patent law and to promote uniformity. See Petition for
Rehearing En Banc: Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 3–7, In re Apple Inc.,
562 Fed. Appx. 983 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (No. 13-0156), 2014 WL 1668975, at *3–7. Amici
noted:
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the Fifth and the Sixth Circuits relating to venue transfer treat non-practicing-entity
plaintiffs differently. Precedents reviewing cases from the Fifth Circuit discount the
initial choice of venue of such plaintiffs, whereas precedents reviewing cases from
the Sixth Circuit do not. The decision to treat such plaintiffs one way or another is
ultimately a substantive law determination about the rights and remedies of nonpracticing entities, and that determination differs, depending on where a case is
initially brought. These disparate substantive law determinations then stand, to be
applied in other cases and other patent-law contexts or, at the very least, to further
enable these sorts of disagreements about an underlying issue of substantive law to
go unresolved. For example, since the Federal Circuit has decided Barnes & Noble,
the court has indicated in at least a few opinions that non-practicing entities are not
prevented from enforcing their patent rights simply because they do not practice
them.164 At the same time, other opinions suggest that at least some judges on the
Federal Circuit believe the remedies available to a patentholder may turn on the
patentholder’s status as a non-practicing entity.165 The court’s views on the ability
of non-practicing entities to enforce their patent rights, on the one hand, and the
remedies afforded to such entities once they do enforce their rights, on the other, are
not necessarily irreconcilable. But reconciling these views does necessitate a

Because the regional circuits lack appellate jurisdiction in patent cases, their
jurisprudence has not and cannot evolve to take into account the venue challenges
of patent litigation. . . . These regional circuits have adopted a series of legal
principles—such as a presumption in favor of the plaintiff’s choice of forum—
that may make sense in the type of civil cases the regional circuits hear, but make
little sense in a patent case brought by a holding company with no meaningful
connection to the forum. A uniform and nationwide body of Federal Circuit law
will allow this Court to tailor “the conveniences of parties and witnesses” and the
“interest of justice” to the specific needs of patent infringement cases.
Id. at 7, 2014 WL 1668975, at *7; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 17, Emerson
Elec. Co. v. E.D. Tex., 135 S. Ct. 339 (2014) (No. 14–44), 2014 WL 3492060, at *17 (“The
divergent circuit law is driving divergent outcomes in patent cases.”).
164
See Thermolife Int’l LLC v. GNC Corp., 922 F.3d 1347, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2019)
(“[T]he patent statute does not restrict enforceable patent rights to those who practice the
patent.”); Lexmark Intern., Inc. v. Impression Products, Inc., 816 F.3d 721, 743 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (“There is no good reason that a patentee that makes and sells the articles itself should
be denied the ability that is guaranteed to a non-practicing-entity patentee.”); DDR Holdings,
LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“NLG cites no case law
suggesting that prevailing non-practicing entities are not entitled to pre-judgment interest.”).
165
See Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., 801 F.3d 1352, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(Reyna, J., concurring) (noting that the “traditional model” of granting injunctive relief “does
not always apply, particularly when the patentee is a non-practicing entity”); see also I/P
Engine, Inc. v. AOL Inc., 576 Fed. Appx. 982, 985 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (noting that the district
court applied doctrine of laches to non-practicing entity that had acquired patents and then
sought to enforce them).
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normative theory of substantive law regarding the proper treatment of non-practicing
entities. The Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule further enables the court to avoid
resolving these sorts of normative issues of patent law, which is at odds with
Congress’s intent in creating the Federal Circuit in the first place.
At the same time, the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule seeks to maintain
intra-circuit uniformity of procedural law within each of the regional circuits. By
deferring to the regional circuits on issues that do not pertain to patent law, the
Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule may avoid creating intra-district-court
“procedural” conflicts and prevent any confusion that might ensue from these
conflicting decisions. A procedural issue will be decided similarly, regardless of
whether it is appealed to the Federal Circuit or the regional circuit. The end result is
consistency, both from one decision to another decided by the same district court
and from one decision to another across district courts, within a given regional
circuit. Concern for this sort of intra-circuit procedural consistency might explain
the majority’s position in Barnes & Noble. The majority sought to apply Sixth
Circuit precedent because the case originated in the Western District of Tennessee,
located within the Sixth Circuit.166 The dissent, in contrast, was concerned with
avoiding inter-circuit conflict because the issue, in Judge Newman’s view, was not
merely one of procedural law; it implicated substantive patent law.167 Barnes &
Noble thus illustrates that, at least in some instances, it is difficult for the Federal
Circuit to preserve intra-circuit procedural uniformity without sacrificing intercircuit substantive patent law uniformity.
Moreover, the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule cannot avoid creating at
least some intra-circuit procedural inconsistency within the regional circuit courts.
The court’s decisions outlining its choice-of-law rule recognize that some procedural
issues “pertain to,” are “unique to,” or are “related to” patent law and justify the
court deciding the issue under the Federal Circuit’s precedent, rather than the
regional circuit’s precedent.168 Insofar as the precedent of the Federal Circuit and
the precedent of the regional circuits are inconsistent with each other and yield
166

See Barnes & Noble, 743 F.3d at 1383.
Id. at 1385 (Newman, J., dissenting).
168
See Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1574–75 (Fed.
1984) (per curiam) (“We, therefore, rule, as a matter of policy, that the Federal Circuit shall
review procedural matters, that are not unique to patent issues, under the law of the particular
regional circuit court where appeals from the district court would normally lie.” (emphasis
added)); see also Biodex Corp. v. Loredan Biomedical, Inc., 946 F.2d 850, 857 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (“The Panduit court itself further phrased the relevant line of demarcation in fluid
language, noting that the resolution of the issue of deference in particular cases would depend
on whether the procedural matter should ‘pertain to’ or be ‘related to patent issues, [such
that] they have a direct bearing on the outcome.’” (quoting Panduit, 744 F.2d at 1575 n.14));
id. (“In sum, Panduit did not engrave a fixed meaning to the terms ‘unique to,’ ‘related to,’
or ‘pertain[ing] to,’ our exclusive statutory subject matter jurisdiction, but instead recognized
that each case must be decided by reference to the core policy of not creating unnecessary
conflicts and confusion in procedural matters.”).
167
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different results, cases raising issues of patent law and appealed to the Federal
Circuit will be decided inconsistently with those not raising issues of patent law and
appealed to the regional circuit court.
For example, in Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Auto Body Panels of Ohio, Inc.,169
the Federal Circuit reviewed a trial court’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion for a
preliminary injunction. The case originated in the Southern District of Ohio, located
in the Sixth Circuit.170 The court noted that the “generally recognized rule” requires
application of a four-factor test171; however, there was not “uniform agreement on
how the factors are applied in a given case.”172 The court treated “the application of
the factors—that is, the determination of whether a preliminary injunction should be
granted or denied—as a procedural issue.”173 And because the issue “involve[ed]
substantive matters unique to the Federal Circuit,” the court applied its own law,
which required the trial court to “weigh and measure each of the four factors against
the other factors and against the magnitude of the relief requested.”174 This standard
is different from the standard the Sixth Circuit typically applies.175 Chrysler Motor
Corp. is accordingly inconsistent with other, non-patent cases originating in the
Sixth Circuit.
As this Article discusses further below, these differences should be justified on
grounds of substantive law. But there will be differences all the same.

169

Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Auto Body Panels of Ohio, Inc., 908 F.2d 951 (Fed. Cir.

1990).

170

See id. at 952.
Id. In general, that four-factor test requires the party seeking the injunction to
establish: (1) a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, (2) irreparable harm, (3) the
balance of hardships tips in favor of the party seeking the injunction, and (4) the issuance of
an injunction is in the public’s interest. Id.
172
Id.
173
Id. It is debatable whether the issue of whether to grant or deny a preliminary
injunction is “procedural,” rather than “remedial.” See Marcus, Processes of American Law,
supra note 159, at 1197 & n.19 (describing the law pertaining to injunctions as “remedies
law”). But the proper (or improper, as the case may be), characterization of the issue as
procedural is less important than the disparate intra-circuit treatment of procedural issues,
once they are characterized as such.
174
Chrysler Motors Corp., 908 F.2d at 953.
175
Under Sixth Circuit precedent, a district court considering a motion for a preliminary
injunction must also consider four factors:
171

(1) whether the movant has a strong likelihood of success on the merits;
(2) whether the movant would suffer irreparable injury without the injunction;
(3) whether issuance of the injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and
(4) whether the public interest would be served by issuance of the injunction.
Chabad of S. Ohio & Congregation Lubavitch v. City of Cincinnati, 363 F.3d 427, 432 (6th
Cir. 2004). But those factors are simply balanced against each other. See id.
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C. The Trans-Substantivity Principle of Procedural Law and a Related Principle
of Equity
A concept closely related to the substance-procedure dichotomy is the transsubstantivity principle of procedural law, which is the idea that a given procedural
law should apply similarly across different substantive contexts. A related principle
of equity suggests that substantively similar cases should be treated procedurally
similarly. The Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule enables the court to depart from
both principles and to do so in a non-transparent manner.
Under the most common definition, a procedural law is “trans-substantive” if
“in form and manner of application,” it “does not vary from one substantive context
to the next.”176 For example, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, the general venue statute, provides
that “[a] civil action may be brought in a judicial district in which any defendant
resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located.”177
It is an example of a trans-substantive law; with the exception of claims for which
there is a substance-specific venue transfer statute, the general venue statute is meant
to apply in the same manner, regardless of the underlying claims that are brought.
In contrast, 28 U.S.C. § 1400 provides, in part, “[a]ny civil action for patent
infringement may be brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or
where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and
established place of business”178; it applies to patent claims and is therefore a
substance-specific venue statute. Trans-substantivity, therefore, is importantly
contingent on the substance-procedure dichotomy, as it “requires some analytical
separation between substance and procedure.”179 As Professor David Marcus has
described it, “[t]he substance-procedure dichotomy could fairly be described as
trans-substantivity’s jurisprudential prerequisite.”180
A broad conception of trans-substantivity translates into treating cases
procedurally alike, regardless of substantive or other practical differences. 181 One
way of understanding this broad conception is that it would require a uniform
176
Marcus, Processes of American Law, supra note 159, at 1191; see also David
Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal Civil Procedure,
59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 376 (2010) [hereinafter Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future]
(“A procedural rule is trans-substantive if it applies equally to all cases regardless of
substance.”); Jay Tidmarsh, Unattainable Justice: The Form of Complex Litigation and the
Limits of Judicial Power, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 1746 (1992) (“‘[T]ranssubstantivism’ requires that the same set of rules be applicable to all cases . . . .”); J. Maria
Glover, The Supreme Court’s Non-“Transsubstantive” Class Action, 165 U. PA. L. REV.
1625, 1654 (2017) (“‘[T]ranssubstantive’ [is] a term classically defined to mean that the
same procedural rules should apply, in the same way, across different substantive contexts.”).
177
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) (2018).
178
Id. § 1400(b).
179
Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future, supra note 176, at 380–81.
180
Id. at 381.
181
See Tidmarsh, supra note 176, at 1747.
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application of a procedural law both within a substantive body of law and across
multiple bodies of law. Thus, patent cases raising similar procedural issues would
be treated similarly, as would patent cases and tort cases raising similar procedural
issues.
One justification offered for the trans-substantivity principle is that it serves as
a restraint on judicial lawmaking in the face of concerns regarding the “legitimacy,
competency, and effectiveness” of judges as lawmakers.182 Marcus argues that it
prevents judges from “trespass[ing] on legislative terrain” by requiring that judges
either develop procedural law uniformly or, alternatively, refrain from doing so and
leave the legislature to address the issue.183 In addition, he suggests that judges are
not competent to craft particularized procedural law because they lack the ability to
discern problems at a systemic level, do not have the necessary expertise, and suffer
from biases that are exacerbated by the litigation process.184 Furthermore, Marcus
argues that courts suffer from a coordination problem that undermines their ability
to effectively craft particularized procedural law: The multiplicity of decisionmakers
(i.e., judges) at the trial court level make it difficult “to devise a single approach”
and can give rise to intra-circuit inconsistencies, and, at the appellate court level,
numerous decisionmakers give rise to circuit splits.185
Others, however, have justified deviation from the trans-substantivity principle
in a variety of contexts,186 while Professor Bob Bone has argued that the whole idea
182

See, e.g., Marcus, Processes of American Law, supra note 159, at 1220, 1228, 1236,
1248; Cover, supra note 107, at 735–36. Another justification offered is that transsubstantive procedural laws—rules in particular—are flexible enough to accommodate new
claims and theories of liability and, with them, the shifting needs of litigants. For example,
Professor Geoffrey Hazard explained:
The Federal Rules have been an effective instrument of social justice
because they reduce the barriers to the formulation and proof of claims against the
existing systems of authority. Formulation of new theories of legal rights is
simpler, virtually by definition, under a pleading system that is not construed in
terms of old legal categories, as was code pleading and common law pleading.
Proof of new theories of liability likewise is simpler with the aid of comprehensive
discovery.
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2246 (1989).
183
See Marcus, Processes of American Law, supra note 159, at 1228–30.
184
Id. at 1230–31.
185
Id. at 1232–33.
186
See, e.g., Stephen N. Subrin, Fudge Points and Thin Ice in Discovery Reform and
the Case for Selective Substance-Specific Procedure, 46 FLA. L. REV. 27, 45–56 (1994)
(arguing for substance-specific discovery rules in products liability, antitrust, securities,
§ 1983, employment discrimination, and class action suits); Glover, supra note 176, at 1656–
66 (contending that the Supreme Court’s substance-driven class action jurisprudence does
not exceed Rules Enabling Act); Cover, supra note 107, at 734–35 (suggesting that courts
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that procedural rules are trans-substantive in the first place is an illusion.187 No
procedural rule, Bone argues, can be justified “exclusively by reference to
procedural values”;188 instead, procedural rules must ultimately be justified by the
substantive ends they serve, and because the substantive interests at stake vary from
case to case, different procedural rules might consequently be called for.189 Professor
Maria Glover makes a similar point, arguing that a court’s substance-specific—i.e.,
non-trans-substantive—applications of procedural law are within the scope of a
court’s lawmaking authority, so long as they are justified on substantive grounds.190
Glover points out that judges may legitimately engage in substantive, interstitial
lawmaking: “[F]ederal courts are very much in the business of making, interpreting
and providing content to federal rights.”191 But what courts may not do, she argues,
is “interpret or apply substantive law differently from one procedural context to the
next.”192 She calls this principle of judicial procedural lawmaking power the
“principle of procedural symmetry.”193 She notes, “it is perfectly acceptable under
the symmetry principle . . . for the same procedural rule to apply differently in
different substantive contexts.”194 Thus, although procedural law need not create
uniformity across substantive bodies of law, it can and should create uniformity
within one substantive body of law. Two patent cases raising similar procedural
issues would be treated similarly, and two tort cases raising similar procedural issues
would be treated similarly, but it is not necessary for the patent cases to be treated
like the tort cases. The suggestion of these scholars’ arguments is that judges may

may use Rule 23 to effectuate substantive ends); Tidmarsh, supra note 176, at 1791–1801,
1805–06, 1808 (“[A] formal analysis of complex litigation dictates that some relaxation of
the trans-substantive ideal will need to occur in order to accommodate the peculiar problem
of complex cases.”).
187
See Robert G. Bone, Securing the Normative Foundation of Litigation Reform, 86
B.U. L. REV. 1155, 1160 (2006).
188
See id.
189
See id. at 1160–63, 1161 (“[T]he social benefit of procedure must always be
measured in terms of the substantive values at stake.”).
190
See Glover, supra note 176, at 1655–57; see also Cover, supra note 107, at 735
(“The Rules Enabling Act might then be read to mean that the courts, in applying the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure or any subsequently enacted similar body of rules, may not forsake
their responsibility to justify substantive impact in terms of substantive values. It would not
be enough to point to Rule 23; one would have to justify invoking it.”); Bone, supra note
187, at 1159 (“[Cover’s] deeper point was that sometimes the justification for a procedural
choice necessarily had to take account of substantive policies, and in such cases, judges
should explain their choices publicly and make the connection to substantive policy
explicit.”).
191
Glover, supra note 176, at 1656.
192
Id. at 1657.
193
Id.
194
Id.
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depart from the trans-substantivity principle as long as doing so is a legitimate
exercise of judicial lawmaking.195
Application of the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule causes divergence from
both the trans-substantivity principle and Glover’s symmetry principle. But because
of the Federal Circuit’s unique jurisdictional grant, divergence from the transsubstantivity principle is justified, even on the terms offered by the principle’s
proponents. However, it is the transgression from Glover’s symmetry principle that
presents reason for concern.
The Federal Circuit’s application of its choice-of-law rule explicitly
contemplates a substance-specific application of some procedural rules or doctrines.
Since the court first considered the choice-of-law issue in Panduit, it has recognized
that there may be procedural matters that “pertain to” or are “related to” patent
issues, and, in those cases, the court applies and develops its own law.196 Although
it need not have done so, the court has implemented this rule by applying and
developing its own law in a patent-specific manner.
The balancing test the court applied in Chrysler Motor Corp. to determine
whether to grant a preliminary injunction is one example of the court’s application
of a patent-specific rule.197 Likewise, Judge Newman’s dissent in Barnes & Noble
reflects the judgment that the issue of venue transfer pursuant to section 1404
implicates issues of patent law and therefore justifies a departure from the regionalspecific procedural law. Judge Newman’s justification for according the plaintiff’s
choice of forum only minimal deference appropriately turns on rationale pertinent
to patent law—i.e., because the plaintiff was a non-practicing patentholder.
Both Chrysler Motors Corp. and Judge Newman’s Barnes & Noble dissent
procedurally treat cases differently because of issues of substantive law—i.e.,
because of issues pertinent to patent law. But because of the Federal Circuit’s unique
jurisdiction, the court’s substance-specific crafting of procedural law does not
present many of the concerns raised by critics of substance-specific procedural law.
First, these sorts of divergences derive from permissible judgments about patent law.
As a federal court, the Federal Circuit may engage in interstitial lawmaking with
respect to the interpretation of, and rights and remedies provided by, federal laws.198
And the Federal Circuit was created for the very purpose of interpreting and applying
195

This insight raises important questions about the full breadth of the judiciary’s
lawmaking powers, an examination of which is beyond the scope of this Article, but which
is worthy of further inquiry.
196
Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1575 n.14 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (per curiam).
197
Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Auto Body Panels of Ohio, Inc., 908 F.2d 951, 952–53
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (observing that application of factors in balancing test is a procedural issue
and that Federal Circuit would apply its own law because question on appeal involved
substantive patent matters).
198
Cf. Glover, supra note 176, at 638–43 (discussing the Supreme Court’s interstitial
lawmaking as a legitimate exercise of the Court’s authority and as an explanation for its nontranssubstantive class action decisions).
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patent law in a uniform manner. The court therefore has a particular mandate to
engage in interstitial lawmaking with respect to patent law. This mandate lends
legitimacy to the court’s creation of patent-specific procedural rules and law.199
Second, because the Federal Circuit hears virtually all appeals raising an issue
of patent law,200 it has a privileged vantage point. It can discern systemic, rather than
merely unique, problems pertinent to patent law. In addition, this vantage point has
enabled the court to acquire expertise pertaining to the way particularized rules may
serve patent law’s needs. And because many of the parties and lawyers before the
Federal Circuit are repeat players,201 they have an incentive to bring systemic issues
to the court’s attention, including the effects of particular procedural laws and
doctrines.202 The court, therefore, has the competency to craft patent-specific
departures from otherwise trans-substantive procedural laws.203
And third, because of the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction over claims
arising under the patent laws, the court does not face the same sort of coordination
problems that typically afflict federal courts crafting particularized rules.
Specifically, the Federal Circuit can devise a single, patent-specific approach to
procedural problems that can be implemented uniformly at the appellate level.204
Thus, in some instances, the Federal Circuit’s decision to apply and develop its own
patent-specific procedural law seems to be a legitimate exercise of the court’s power.
But in other instances—where the court defers to the regional circuits on
arguably procedural issues—the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule causes the
court to treat substantively similar cases procedurally differently. And this
divergence is not so easily justified.
Consider again Barnes & Noble. The majority’s and dissent’s opinions reveal
that, in at least some instances, the regional circuit procedural law differs in
important respects. Indeed, in the case of the Fifth and Sixth Circuits’ venue-transfer
precedents, they are actually inconsistent in two respects. It is useful to evaluate the
199

Cf. Marcus, Processes of American Law, supra note 159, at 1228 (arguing that
judges lack “lawmaking legitimacy” and, therefore, one justification for trans-substantivity
is that it constrains judges from “trespass[ing] on legislative terrain”).
200
See supra note 42.
201
See Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity
Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1628 n.40 (2007) (noting that bias at the Federal Circuit
is unlikely in part because parties that appear before court often “enjoy the advantages of
repeat play” (quoting Rochelle Dreyfuss, Pathological Patenting: The PTO as Cause or
Cure, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1559, 1569 (2006))).
202
Cf. Marcus, Processes of American Law, supra note 159, at 1191 (arguing that
judges lack the competency to create substance-specific process doctrine because they are
biased and receive asymmetrical information from litigants).
203
Cf. id. at 1230–31 (arguing that judges lack the competency to craft substancespecific process law and that trans-substantivity protects against “inexpert, biased decisionmaking”).
204
Cf. id. at 1232–33 (arguing that judges face a “coordination” problem in creating
substance-specific process law because of the difficulties in “devis[ing] a single approach”
to procedural problems and, among other things, the division among circuit courts of appeal).
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two inconsistencies in isolation to identify the problem each presents and determine
whether either can be justified.
First, the two circuits differ in the quantum of showing a defendant must make
in order to overcome a plaintiff’s initial choice of venue. This difference is, at least
on its face, a difference that can be applied uniformly across all cases. In other
words, the difference is seemingly trans-substantive. The Federal Circuit applies the
same venue transfer standard to all claims—whether patent, tort, contract, or
otherwise—that originate from the Fifth Circuit. And likewise, it applies the same
venue transfer standard to all claims that originate from the Sixth Circuit.
But a comparison between cases originating from the Fifth and Sixth Circuits
and within one substantive body of law reveals the non-trans-substantive effect.
Because of the difference in the two circuits’ standards, a case that includes patent
claims originating in the Fifth Circuit is more likely to be transferred to another
venue than a case that includes patent claims originating in the Sixth Circuit.205 In
other words, cases that are substantively similar—because they include patent
claims—are being treated procedurally differently.
The question is whether this non-trans-substantive application of the venue
transfer statute can be justified. Is the disparate application of the venue transfer
statute a legitimate exercise of the Federal Circuit’s authority to engage in
lawmaking? Perhaps. The disparate treatment of cases from the Fifth and Sixth
Circuits is not justified on grounds of patent law—i.e., it is not an interpretation of
patent law that yields this disparate treatment. Nor is it an interpretation of the
Federal Circuit’s jurisdictional statute that yields this different result.206 Indeed, it is
purportedly not an interpretation of any statute at all. Rather, it is a “policy” decision
by the Federal Circuit that justifies this disparate application of the venue transfer
205

Id.
Were the non-trans-substantive application of the venue transfer statute the result of
the court’s interpretation of its jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1295, the question would
likely be an easier one. A jurisdictional statute is arguably “procedural.” See Marcus, The
Processes of American Law, supra note 159, at 1223 (noting that, through their opinions,
judges make procedural law, which includes law pertaining to federal subject matter
jurisdiction). Thus, the disparate application of the venue transfer statute would be justified
not on substantive grounds, but rather on procedural grounds. However, the justification
would be related to a procedural law (the jurisdictional statute) other than the one being
inconsistently applied (the venue transfer statute). Nonetheless, the obligation of determining
the scope of a federal court’s jurisdiction has always been one given to the courts,
themselves. See, e.g., Local 377, RWDSU, UFCW v. 1864 Tenants Ass’n, 533 F.3d 98, 99
(2d Cir. 2008) (“The federal courts are under an independent obligation to examine their own
jurisdiction.” (quoting Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 69 F.3d 650, 659 (2d Cir. 1995)
(alteration omitted)); Micei Int’l. v. Dep’t of Commerce, 613 F.3d 1147, 1151 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (“Federal courts are courts of limited subject-matter jurisdiction and ‘every federal
appellate court has a special obligation to satisfy itself . . . of its own jurisdiction . . . .”
(quoting Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986))); cf. United
States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002) (“[I]t is familiar law that a federal court always has
jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction.”).
206
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statute.207 This raises a question of whether the court was acting within its powers
when it adopted its choice-of-law rule in the first place. Or, alternatively, whether
the Federal Circuit’s adoption of the rule was an instance in which the court was
“trespass[ing] on legislative terrain.”208 Although a full inquiry into the Federal
Circuit’s lawmaking power is beyond the scope of this Article, as long as the court’s
choice-of-law rule was within the court’s power, treating cases that originate from
the Fifth and Sixth Circuits procedurally differently would be justified. What is
important is that the court treats these cases differently in a transparent way that
exposes the underlying policy determination that arguably justifies it. And, at least
with respect to the disparate treatment resulting from the different quantum of
showings, the Federal Circuit was transparent.
But the venue transfer precedent relating to cases that originated from the Fifth
and Sixth Circuits differ in a second respect. Certain types of patent plaintiffs—
specifically, non-practicing entities—are treated differently, depending on the
circuit from which the case came. The Federal Circuit is less deferential to a
plaintiff’s initial choice of forum when the plaintiff is a non-practicing entity and
the case originated in the Fifth Circuit, rather than in the Sixth Circuit.
This difference is, itself, actually composed of two discrete differences that can
be disentangled from each other. The first is that non-practicing-entity-patent
plaintiffs are treated differently than other types of plaintiffs. As discussed above,
this difference can be justified on grounds of substantive patent law—i.e., patent law
should not accord the same rights and remedies to certain types of plaintiffs.209 And
it is therefore a permissible exercise of the Federal Circuit’s substantive lawmaking
powers.
The second difference is that non-practicing-entity-patent plaintiffs from the
Fifth Circuit are treated differently than non-practicing-entity-patent plaintiffs from
the Sixth Circuit. In other words, the Federal Circuit treats substantively similar
cases (patent cases involving plaintiffs that are non-practicing entities) procedurally
differently.210 It is this second difference that is difficult to justify. It is not justified
on grounds of patent law. There is no reason, under patent law, to treat certain patent
plaintiffs who file suit in the Fifth Circuit differently from those same types of patent
plaintiffs who file suit in the Sixth Circuit.
But perhaps it is justified on grounds of the court’s broader lawmaking
authority. This authority would have arguably empowered the court to adopt its
choice-of-law rule. And this choice-of-law rule, in turn, would have enabled the
court to apply the disparate law of the regional circuits. But an examination of the
Fifth, Sixth, and Federal Circuits’ precedents suggests that the court’s disparate

207

See Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1574–75 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (per curiam).
208
Marcus, The Processes of American Law, supra note 159, at 1228.
209
See supra Section III.B.
210
See In re Barnes & Noble, Inc., 743 F.3d 1381, 1383–84 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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treatment is not so justified. It is not the Fifth Circuit that treats non-practicing
entities differently from other plaintiffs. Rather, it is the Federal Circuit that does so.
In each of two different cases that predate Barnes & Noble and that originate in
the Fifth Circuit, a defendant sought a writ of mandamus, directing the Eastern
District of Texas to vacate its order denying a motion to transfer and to transfer the
case to the defendant’s chosen venue.211 In each case, the Federal Circuit concluded
that the writ of mandamus should be granted and the action transferred because the
plaintiff had merely a fabricated connection to the forum in which it had initially
filed suit.212 Although both plaintiffs had offices in the Eastern District of Texas,
neither plaintiff actually had employees there.213 But in reaching these decisions, the
Federal Circuit was not applying Fifth Circuit law.214 Sure, in stating the standard
that was generally applicable to issues of venue transfer, the Federal Circuit relied
on Fifth Circuit law.215 But the issue of how to treat a plaintiff who did not practice
its patents was not an issue ever addressed by the Fifth Circuit’s precedent.216
Instead, it was an issue first identified by the Federal Circuit. Thus, it is not the
Federal Circuit’s strict adherence to its choice-of-law rule that yields different
treatment of certain types of patent plaintiffs.
So, what was the justification for treating non-practicing entities differently in
the Fifth Circuit? One possibility is that the Federal Circuit’s earlier cases
originating in the Fifth Circuit had, indeed, applied the venue transfer statute in a
substance-specific way. But because of the court’s choice-of-law rule and prior
decisions characterizing issues of venue as “procedural,” the court departed from the
trans-substantivity principle sub silentio. The disagreement in Barnes & Noble
might then be understood as whether it was proper for prior panels of the Federal
Circuit to depart from the trans-substantivity principle, the precepts of the court’s
choice-of-law rule, or both. But regardless of the answers to those questions, if those
earlier cases from the Fifth Circuit were, indeed, initially justified on grounds of
patent law, the court’s venue transfer decisions, as a whole—including decisions
from the Fifth Circuit and the other courts of appeals—are likely an illegitimate
exercise of the court’s lawmaking authority. Or, to state it in terms of Glover’s
symmetry principle, the Federal Circuit is impermissibly interpreting or applying
substantive patent law differently from one procedural context to the next.
Another possibility is that the Federal Circuit’s earlier venue transfer decisions
reflect not a judgment about substantive patent law, but rather something about the
211

See In re Zimmer Holdings, Inc., 609 F.3d 1378, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re
Microsoft Corp., 630 F.3d 1361, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
212
See Zimmer, 609 F.3d at 1382 (granting writ in part because “the only connection
between this case and the plaintiff’s chosen forum is a legal fiction”); Microsoft, 630 F.3d at
1365 (granting writ because plaintiff’s connection to forum was “a construct for litigation
and appeared to exist for no other purpose than to manipulate venue”).
213
See Zimmer, 609 F.3d at 1381; Microsoft, 630 F.3d at 1365.
214
See Zimmer, 609 F.3d at 1381; Microsoft, 630 F.3d at 1364–65.
215
See Zimmer, 609 F.3d at 1380; Microsoft, 630 F.3d at 1363.
216
See Zimmer, 609 F.3d at 1380; Microsoft, 630 F.3d at 1363.
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Fifth Circuit and the Eastern District of Texas more specifically. The Eastern District
of Texas has earned the reputation of being a venue hospitable to patent plaintiffs,
particularly plaintiffs that are non-practicing entities.217 The district’s popularity
stems from multiple factors, including the accelerated timing of discovery, the
extended time to respond to motions to transfer and reluctance to grant such motions,
the timing of claim construction hearings relative to discovery, and the Federal
Circuit’s exercise of its discretion in a manner that dampens the effects of legislative
reforms and the commands of Supreme Court rulings.218 The Eastern District of
Texas and the patent system, more generally, have come under attack, in part
because of the ability of non-practicing-entity-patent plaintiffs to control the
litigation in such a meaningful way simply by bringing suit in one forum over
another.219 The Federal Circuit’s earlier decisions ordering a transfer from the
Eastern District of Texas may ultimately have been an effort to send a message to
the Eastern District of Texas and address these systemic issues.
It is questionable whether the Federal Circuit’s lawmaking authority embraces
addressing these sorts of systemic problems. Because these problems are the result
of a variety of different failures in the litigation process, correcting them is likely
best addressed by Congress. And indeed, legislation that aimed to ameliorate these
problems by limiting where patent suits could be brought was introduced in 2016.220
That said, the legislation appears to have died in the Senate Judiciary Committee.221
In the face of such system failures, including the failure of Congress to appropriately
address weaknesses in the litigation process, perhaps appellate review by the Federal
Circuit seemed like the only hope of addressing them.222
217
See, e.g., Love & Yoon, supra note 135 passim (evaluating the reasons why the
Eastern District of Texas is so popular among plaintiffs and concluding that it is generally
plaintiff friendly, although there are other rationale explaining the district’s popularity).
218
See id. at 16, 21–34.
219
See id. at 23–24 (“[T]he relative timing of discovery, transfer, and Markman ensures
that, by virtue of being sued in the Eastern District, an accused infringer will be forced to
incur large discovery costs, regardless of the case’s connection to East Texas or the merits
of its noninfringement contentions.”).
220
Venue Equity and Non-Uniformity Elimination Act of 2016, S. 2733, 114th Cong.
(2016).
221
An examination of the bill’s history indicates that the bill’s referral to the Senate
Judiciary Committee was the last action. Id.
222
It is worth noting that, in 2017, the Supreme Court decided TC Heartland LLC v.
Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017), which may have curtailed a patent
troll’s ability to bring suit against a defendant in the Eastern District of Texas. TC Heartland
considered the definition of the word “resides” in the patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1400(b). Id. at 1516–17. The Court concluded that “resides” in that statute meant “State of
incorporation.” Id. at 1517, 1521. The Court’s decision overturned prior precedent of the
Federal Circuit, which had held that “resides” in the patent venue statute meant the same
thing as “resides” in the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) and (c). See id. at 1519–
20 (discussing the Federal Circuit’s precedent, including VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas
Appliance Co., 917 F. 2d 1574 (1990)). The definition of “resides” in the general venue
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Of course, this is all speculation about the court’s “true” rationale for its
disparate treatment of non-practicing-entity-patent plaintiffs from the Fifth and
Sixth Circuits. The reason for this speculation is that the only rationale provided—
adherence to the court’s choice-of-law rule—neither fully explains nor justifies the
court’s decision. And any other rationale is not provided. It is this lack of
transparency that is perhaps what is most concerning about the court’s decision. It
deprives the Supreme Court, Congress, practitioners, and the public of an
opportunity to contemplate the court’s reasons and assess the legitimacy of its
lawmaking in light of the rationale provided.
The implications of this analysis are twofold. First, and most importantly, the
court’s choice-of-law rule is serving as a mechanism to obscure substantive
judgments, whether about patent law, systemic concerns in federal court
adjudication, or other issues. It adds another decisional rule to the calculus of
deciding cases. And the interpretation, accommodation, and application of that rule
create both an opportunity for confusion and a refuge in which determinations that
are difficult—because, for example, they are politically polarizing or at the outer
bounds of the court’s lawmaking authority—can “hide out.” The second implication
flows from the first. By obscuring substantive determinations, the choice-of-law rule
provides the court with a mechanism that enables it to depart from its prior
determinations. These departures, in turn, undermine the court’s objective of
developing patent law in a uniform manner.
D. Forum Shopping
One of the motivations for the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule was to
discourage forum shopping. Recall that, in Atari, the plaintiff brought suit in the
Northern District of Illinois, raising claims under patent law as well as copyright
statute permits plaintiffs to bring suit against a defendant in any judicial district in which the
defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction. Id. at 1519; see also 28 U.S.C. § l391(a), (c)
(2018). Because many large corporations sell products all over the United States, they are
subject to personal jurisdiction in most, if not all, judicial districts in the United States. As a
result, the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the patent venue statute enabled patent plaintiffs
to bring suit against patent defendants virtually anywhere they wanted, and especially the
Eastern District of Texas. The Supreme Court’s rejection of the Federal Circuit’s
interpretation of “resides” in the patent venue statute prevents patent plaintiffs from bringing
suit against patent defendants virtually anywhere they want and, therefore, arguably
corrected for the systemic problem potentially underlying Barnes & Noble. The patent venue
statute, however, also permits a patent plaintiff to bring suit against a defendant in the judicial
district “where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and
established place of business,” 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), and the meaning of that phrase is not
entirely clear and is continuing to be debated.
But the fact that the Supreme Court’s decision in TC Heartland may have, at least
partially, corrected for the specific, systemic concern underlying Barnes & Noble should not
distract from the more general problems created by court’s choice-of-law rule, which persist
even after TC Heartland.
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law.223 The district court preliminarily enjoined the defendant from contributory
copyright infringement, and the defendant appealed the district court’s order to the
Federal Circuit.224 The plaintiff responded by filing a motion to transfer the appeal
from the Federal Circuit to the Seventh Circuit,225 where, but for the patent claims,
the plaintiff’s suit otherwise would have been appealed. The Federal Circuit denied
the plaintiff’s motion, concluding that its jurisdiction extended over an entire case,
not just “patent issues.”226 But the court extended its choice-of-law rule to
substantive issues and concluded that the Seventh Circuit’s precedent should apply
to the substantive issue of contributory copyright infringement.227
Part of the Federal Circuit’s rationale for both its interpretation of its
jurisdictional statute, as well as its adoption of its choice-of-law rule, was the desire
to discourage plaintiffs from “appellate forum shopping.” The legislative history of
the court’s enabling statute reveals Congress’s concern with a party adding “trivial
patent claims” in order to “manipulate appellate jurisdiction.”228 In other words,
Congress aimed to prevent regional-circuit-/Federal-Circuit- appellate forum
shopping. The court’s choice-of-law rule sought to prevent this sort of “game.”229
By deferring to the law of the regional circuit on issues not pertinent to substantive
patent law, the court’s choice-of-law rule would deter a plaintiff from adding patent
claims simply to escape the law of the circuit court that would otherwise apply.
Although the court’s opinion articulated its choice-of-law rule with respect to nonpatent substantive law, its reasoning applies equally to the court’s rule as to
procedural law.
Considered alone, the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule is reasonably
designed to prevent this type of appellate forum shopping. It provides a plaintiff no
incentive to join patent claims to its suit because, regardless of whether a suit
contains patent claims, the regional circuit’s procedural law applies. In addition,
even as applied, the rule is narrowly drawn such that the Federal Circuit attempts to
apply its own precedent only to issues actually implicating patent law. For example,
the court has consistently applied Federal Circuit precedent to issues of personal
jurisdiction that are “intimately involved with the substance of the patent laws.”230
223

Atari Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
Id. at 1424, 1427.
225
See id. at 1427.
226
See id. at 1440.
227
See id.
228
S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 20 (1981), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 30.
229
See Atari, 747 F.2d at 1437–38 (discussing forum shopping and noting “[f]orum
shopping is a game at which two can play”).
230
See Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1654–65 (Fed.
Cir. 1994) (concluding that the Federal Circuit should develop and apply its own law relating
to personal jurisdiction based on stream of commerce theory because the issue of personal
jurisdiction “is a critical determinant of whether and in what forum a patentee can seek
redress for infringement of its rights” and there was no apparent uniformity on the issue in
the regional circuit courts); see also Electronics For Imaging, Inc. v. Coyle, 340 F.3d 1344,
224
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But for the court’s practice, there could be an opportunity for manipulation. A
plaintiff could strategically join a patent claim to her suit just to secure the Federal
Circuit’s personal jurisdiction precedent for her entire case, if such precedent were
more favorable to the plaintiff’s suit than the regional circuit precedent that would
otherwise apply. But the Federal Circuit has attempted to prevent this sort of
manipulative joining of patent claims by applying its personal jurisdiction precedent
only to jurisdictional inquiries related to the underlying patent claims.231
However, the Federal Circuit expressed no concern for regionalcircuit/regional-circuit forum shopping. Yet, the legislative history of the court’s
enabling statute reveals that Congress was also concerned with this type of forum
shopping. Congress vested the Federal Circuit with exclusive jurisdiction over
patent appeals for the very purpose of removing any incentive plaintiffs might have
for choosing one forum over another for what might be perceived as more favorable
patent law.232 The Federal Circuit’s rule does not discourage this sort of forum
shopping at the trial court level, at least with respect to non-patent issues. Under the
court’s rule, regional circuit non-patent procedural law continues to apply. A
plaintiff therefore has every incentive to file suit in a circuit that has procedural law
favorable to its claims. In this respect, the court’s rule is seemingly neutral; it does
not appear to change a party’s incentives to file suit in one circuit over another. But
because of the falsity of the substance-procedure dichotomy and the court’s
disuniform application of procedural law in a substance-specific manner, the court’s
rule further encourages plaintiffs to choose a particular forum for the way that
forum’s procedural law interacts with patent law. For example, after Barnes &
Noble, a plaintiff that is a non-practicing entity would be better served to bring suit
in the Sixth Circuit, rather than the Fifth Circuit. The plaintiff’s initial choice of
forum is more likely to be respected in the Sixth Circuit both because of the Sixth
Circuit’s relatively more difficult standard for justifying a transfer of venue and
because embedded in the balancing test is a judgment that a non-practicing entity
plaintiff is entitled to the same rights and remedies as a patentholder that practices
its patents.233
To be sure, the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule is likely not the only factor
contributing to forum shopping. Federal district courts may adopt their own local
rules,234 and many adopt patent-specific rules.235 In addition, some individual judges
1348 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Akro Corp. v. Luker, 45 F.3d 1541, 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
231
See Electronics for Imaging, 340 F.3d at 1348 (applying Federal Circuit precedent
to jurisdictional inquiry related to patent invalidity claim and applying Ninth Circuit
precedent to state law misappropriation of trade secret and contract claims).
232
See S. REP. NO. 97–275, at 19 (1981), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 29
(“This measure is intended to alleviate the serious problems of forums [sic] shopping among
the regional courts of appeals on patent claims by investing exclusive jurisdiction in one
court of appeals.”).
233
See supra text accompanying notes 137–56.
234
See FED. R. CIV. P. 83.
235
See, e.g., E.D. Tex. Patent Rules, http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/?q=patent-rules
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have adopted their own patent rules.236 These local rules are far from uniform.237
Consequently, these rules serve as a basis for forum shopping.238 In addition, if a
plaintiff’s suit includes non-patent claims arising under federal law, consideration
of the applicable regional circuit law likely affects the plaintiff’s analysis as well.
Other considerations related to personal jurisdiction, venue, and traditional choiceof-law concerns may additionally influence a plaintiff to choose one forum over
another. None of these additional factors, however, should distract from the fact that
the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule may well contribute to forum shopping, at
least as between the regional circuits.
E. Specialization of the Federal Circuit
The legislative history of the Federal Circuit’s enabling statute makes clear that
Congress did not intend the Federal Circuit to be a “specialized court.” Indeed, both
the House and Senate Reports explicitly state that Congress was not creating a
[https://perma.cc/TMR2-Q2AW]; N. D. Cal. Patent Rules, https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/
localrules/patent [https://perma.cc/V749-QJ6P]; E.D. Va. Patent Rules, http://www.vaed.us
courts.gov/localrules/ LocalRulesEDVA.pdf [https://perma.cc/698G-ZN2K].
236
See, e.g., Megan M. La Belle, The Local Rules of Patent Procedure, 47 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 63, 66 (2015). These judge-specific local patent rules have been characterized as “locallocal patent rules.” See id.; see also Paul D. Carrington, Renovating Discovery, 49 ALA. L.
REV. 51, 56 (1997) (noting that local rules, including standing orders, are sometimes referred
to as “local local rules”).
237
As with procedural law, more generally, both the design and application of local
patent rules can reflect a judgment about the underlying substantive law. Recognizing the
“close relationship” between local patent rules and the enforcement of substantive patent
law, the Federal Circuit applies its own precedent when reviewing the validity, interpretation,
and application of these rules. See 02 Micro Intern. Ltd. v. Monolithic Power Sys., Inc., 467
F.3d 1355, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[T]he local rules in question are not only unique to patent
cases but also are likely to directly affect the substantive patent law theories that may be
presented at trial, being designed specifically to require parties to crystallize their theories of
the case early in the litigation so as to prevent the shifting sands approach to claim
construction. Under such circumstances we conclude that issues concerning the validity and
interpretation of such local rules are intimately involved in the substance of enforcement of
the patent right and must be governed by the law of this circuit.” (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted)). But the Federal Circuit is “very deferential,” Safeclick, L.L.C. v. Visa
Intern. Serv. Ass’n, 2006 WL 3017347, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 23, 2006), to the district courts
with respect to these rules, and, accordingly, its review of them has not yielded uniformity
across all local rules.
238
See, e.g., La Belle, supra note 236, at 95–102 (arguing that local patent rules
“undermine uniformity in patent law” because they have a number of differences between
them, and arguing for a national set of procedural rules); cf. Yan Leychkis, Of Fire Ants and
Claim Construction: An Empirical Study of the Meteoric Rise of the Eastern District of Texas
as a Preeminent Forum for Patent Litigation, 9 YALE J.L. & TECH. 193, 209, 226 (2007)
(arguing that one of the reasons why patent holders prefer the Eastern District of Texas was
the district’s local patent rules, and suggesting national rules of procedure for patent suits).
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specialized court.239 To ensure against specialization, Congress granted the Federal
Circuit jurisdiction over not only patent appeals, but also “a varied docket spanning
a broad range of legal issues and types of cases.”240 The Federal Circuit “inherit[ed]
all the appellate jurisdiction” of its two predecessor courts.241 Thus, the Federal
Circuit has jurisdiction over all patent appeals from all federal district courts and the
Patent and Trademark Office, and it has the power to hear appeals in suits against
the government for damages or for the refund of federal taxes, all federal contract
appeals in which the United States is a defendant, appeals from the Court of
International Trade, and a few other agency review cases.242
The Atari decision was cognizant of this legislative history and considered it
carefully in construing the breadth of the Federal Circuit’s appellate jurisdiction.243
But the court did not consider how its choice-of-law rule might contribute to the
specialization of the court.
It is worth clarifying what is meant by a “specialized” court. Professor Edward
Cheng has suggested that there is a spectrum, ranging from generalist on one end, to
“narrow specialist” on the other.244 But, practically, he defines a court as
“specialized” if it “deviates from the generalist ideal,” which he defines as a “court
that hears all cases (or a close approximation).”245 Although Congress did not intend
the Federal Circuit to be specialized, “as that term is normally used,”246 it deviates
from the generalist ideal. And, as a result, characterizing the Federal Circuit has
proved challenging to scholars and commentators.247
239

H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 19 (1981) (“The proposed new court is not a ‘specialized
court.’”); S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 6 (1981), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 16 (“The
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit will not be a ‘specialized court,’ as that term is
normally used.”).
240
H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 19 (1981).
241
H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 18 (1981).
242
See H.R. REP. NO. 97-312 (1981); Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, supra note
38.
243
See Atari Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1436–37 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
244
Edward K. Cheng, The Myth of the Generalist Judge, 61 STAN. L. REV. 519, 526
(2008).
245
Id. at 526–27.
246
S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 6 (1981), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 16.
247
Compare Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, supra note 38, at 391 (noting that the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals “merged with the Court of Claims to create the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which retained its specialized authority”), id. at 404
(“Congress decided to create a new kind of specialized tribunal.”), Dreyfuss, A Case Study,
supra note 16, at 29–30 & n.178 (describing Federal Circuit as a specialized court), and John
M. Golden, The Federal Circuit and the D.C. Circuit: Comparative Trials of Two SemiSpecialized Courts, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 553, 553 n.2 (2010) (describing the Federal
Circuit as “semi-specialized” because “substantial portions of [its] docket[] encompass[]
issues outside . . . patent law”), with Randall R. Rader, Specialized Courts: The Legislative
Response, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1003, 1012 (1991) (suggesting that the Federal Circuit has not
become a specialized court).
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But regardless of how the court is characterized, there is an issue of how to
assess how “generalist” the court was intended to be by design and whether its
choice-of-law rule may have caused the court to develop into a more specialized
court. In one respect, the court’s rule has the potential to effect greater specialization.
The rule generally requires the Federal Circuit to defer to the regional circuit courts
on issues of procedural law that do not pertain to patent law. Through the rule, the
court is attempting to “segregate” issues of patent law from issues of procedural
law.248 But Professor Rochelle Dreyfuss suggests this sort of “segregability” comes
at a cost. In evaluating specialized adjudication, more generally, she notes that
segregability can cause the tribunal to isolate itself, “lose touch with the generalized
judiciary, fail to perceive developing trends in the law, and overutilize the techniques
at its disposal.”249 Procedural lawmaking has traditionally been controlled or
supervised by the judiciary.250 Thus, by foregoing the opportunity to interpret, apply,
and develop procedural law, the Federal Circuit may be losing touch with, and
failing to participate in, one of the core functions of a generalized judiciary.
But this theory of the effects of the court’s choice-of-law rule may rest on an
overly formalistic and cramped understanding of judging. When the Federal Circuit
defers to the regional circuit law, it still must engage with the law, apply it to the
facts at hand, and exercise judgment where the law requires the resolution of
ambiguities, whether in a statute, the regional circuit’s precedent, the common law,
or otherwise.251 Indeed, in instances where the regional circuit has not addressed a
particular procedural issue before the Federal Circuit, the court endeavors to predict
how the regional circuit would have decided the issue.252 This process is seemingly
deferential, but in actuality it requires the exercise of judgment.253 Moreover, the
court interprets, applies, and develops its own law with respect to at least some
procedural issues, namely, those that pertain to patent law (however incorrectly the
248

See Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, supra note 38, at 413.
Id.
250
See, e.g., Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future, supra note 176, at 417 (citing
Roscoe Pound, Regulation of Judicial Procedure by Rules of Court, 10 ILL. L. REV. 163, 171
(1915)) (“Judicial control over some modicum of procedural rulemaking has a centuries-old
pedigree in Anglo-American law.”).
251
Cf. Cheng, supra note 244, at 558 (noting that appellate courts can serve a
“lawmaking function, whether through resolving statutory ambiguities, filling gaps in
precedent, or developing pockets of common law”).
252
Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(per curiam) (“Where the regional circuit court has not spoken, we need to predict how that
regional circuit would have decided the issue in light of the decisions of that circuit’s various
district courts, public policy, etc.”).
253
Indeed, Erie and its progeny rest on the assumption that, by applying state
substantive law, federal courts are being duly deferential to the prerogatives of the states.
But that too is a bit of a fiction. See, e.g., Dolores K. Sloviter, A Federal Judge Views
Diversity Jurisdiction Through the Lens of Federalism, 78 VA. L. REV. 1671, 1682 (1992)
(“The federal judge’s prediction of state law in the absence of a dispositive holding of the
state supreme court often verges on the lawmaking function of that state court.”).
249
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court may draw the line between procedural and substantive issues). And in doing
so, it necessarily engages with procedural law and exercises judgment, albeit in a
way that tracks closely to the specialized subject matter. It is therefore uncertain
whether, and if so to what extent, the court’s choice-of-law rule facilitates
specialization of the Federal Circuit.
F. Administrability
Finally, the Federal Circuit was motivated to adopt its choice-of-law rule, at
least in part, because of the rule’s ease of administration. In deciding what precedent
to apply, the Panduit and Atari courts contemplated how the district courts would
implement whatever rule the court articulated. Both concluded that district courts
should not be required to apply the law of two circuits254—to “serve[] two
masters.”255 In addition, the court considered which court—the district courts or the
Federal Circuit—could more easily internalize the challenges associated with any
given rule.256
There is something to this concern. It is almost certainly easier for twelve
judges from the same court, acting collectively, to consistently apply a chosen
choice-of-law rule with an eye toward creating uniformity in substantive patent law,
than it is for the hundreds of district court judges sitting on the ninety-four federal
district courts to internalize and apply the rule in a consistent manner.
But the rule does not entirely eliminate the district court’s burden of having to
apply the procedural law of more than one circuit court. Indeed, the rule was never
designed to do so. Since its articulation in Panduit, the court’s rule has contemplated
that there would be procedural issues pertinent to patent law that would require the
court to apply its own precedent and, accordingly, require the district courts to apply
Federal Circuit precedent in all similar, subsequent cases. At the same time, the
district courts are required to apply the procedural law of the regional circuit in
which they are situated to all other, non-patent issues. The district courts therefore
cannot escape being bound by the authority of two courts of appeals.

254

See Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1439 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(concluding it would be “unfair” to require district courts to apply law of Federal Circuit and
regional circuit to substantive law issue); Panduit, 744 F.2d at 1574 (“[P]ractitioners within
the jurisdiction of a particular regional circuit court should not be required to practice law
and to counsel clients in light of two different sets of law for an identical issue due to the
different routes of appeal. An equal, if not more important, consideration is that district
judges also should not be required to decide cases in this fashion.”).
255
Atari, 747 F.2d at 1439.
256
See Panduit, 744 F.2d at 1575 (“Although the adoption of this policy could on
occasion require this court to reach disparate results in procedural matters in light of disparate
viewpoints from the regional circuit courts, it is nonetheless preferable for the twelve judges
of this court to handle such conflicts rather than for countless practitioners and hundreds of
district judges to do so.” (emphasis added)).

2020]

FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S CHOICE-OF-LAW RULE

521

Moreover, as applied, the rule is likely difficult for district courts to administer.
Because the rule requires the Federal Circuit to identify procedural issues that are
pertinent to patent law such that the Federal Circuit’s precedent should apply, the
rule necessarily requires appellate court review before it is clear which circuit’s
precedent should apply. This sequencing complicates the district court’s process of
deciding patent cases in the first instance, as opposed to on remand. And because it
requires appellate review first, it makes the Federal Circuit’s rule costly to
administer over the long run.
The rule has proven difficult for the Federal Circuit to administer as well. The
court has had to revisit the rule a number of times, redrawing the “boundaries” that
demark the issues to which its precedent applies.257 Perhaps it is unavoidable that,
as a (somewhat) specialized court, the Federal Circuit would be tasked with creating
at least some amount of “boundary law”—what Dreyfuss defines as “criteria for
determining when a case is within its jurisdiction,”258 but which could be extended
to include criteria for determining when a case should be treated by the court’s
precedent. But the question is whether the court’s rule requires it to devote more
resources to boundary lawmaking than a reasonable, alternative choice-of-law rule
might require. Because the rule requires the court to draw a boundary along the
precarious divide between procedure and substance, the court’s boundary law is
destined to require repeated revision. And a rule that did not necessitate regular
attendance to the boundaries—for example, a rule that does not require the court to
parse procedural issues from substantive ones—would be comparatively easier to
administer. Thus, although the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule was created with
at least one of its objectives to make the rule easy to administer, the rule creates a
number of challenges.
***
In sum, the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule creates a number of problems.
Perhaps most importantly, it undermines the court’s ability to develop patent law in
a uniform manner and enables the court to make substantive determinations in a nontransparent way. In addition, the rule contributes to forum shopping among the
regional circuit courts and, in at least some respects, is difficult to administer.
At the same time, the court’s rule discourages forum shopping between the
Federal Circuit, on the one hand, and the regional circuits, on the other; addresses
some of the challenges presented by the court’s unique jurisdictional grant; and is
likely neutral with respect to its effects on the specialization of the Federal Circuit.
Because the elements of this analysis point in opposing directions, it is difficult
to condemn the rule outright. In addition, the root cause of the rule and some of its
257
See, e.g., Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1360 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) (“[W]e conclude that the rigid division between substantive patent law issues and
all other substantive and procedural issues, which was the basis for the court’s choice-of-law
ruling . . . , no longer represents this courts approach to choice-of-law questions in patent
cases.”).
258
Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, supra note 38, at 382.
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negative effects is the court’s unique jurisdictional grant. When considered in light
of the challenges presented by the court’s jurisdiction, it is therefore possible that
alternative rules will fare no better. It is to those potential alternative rules, along
with other potential solutions, that this Article now turns.
IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
There are at least two types of solutions to the challenges posed by the Federal
Circuit’s choice-of-law rule. One is for the court to adopt an alternative choice-oflaw rule. The second is a structural solution that would create specialized trial courts
or, at least, effect the same solution as if such specialized courts were created. Both
solutions are considered below.
A. Alternative Choice-of-Law Rules
There are at least two alternatives to the Federal Circuit’s current rule: apply
the law of the regional court in which a case originated or apply and develop Federal
Circuit law to all issues.
1. Apply the Law of the Originating Regional Circuit
One alternative is a rule that would require the court to apply the law of the
regional circuit in which the case originated to all legal issues, procedural or
otherwise, and regardless of whether those issues pertain to patent law. This
“originating-court” rule is seemingly simple in its formulation. And at first blush, it
seems easy to apply. Indeed, it is somewhat similar to a federal choice-of-law rule
already applied in federal courts.259
But as a practical matter, the originating-court rule may operate similarly to the
rule the court already applies. The originating-court rule would require the federal
courts to faithfully apply the law of the regional circuit court in which a case
originated to all claims, such that the Federal Circuit would be nothing more than a
change in appellate courtrooms.260 But, of course, because of the court’s unique
jurisdictional grant, there is virtually261 no appellate patent law outside of the Federal
259

Specifically, it is analogous to the rule applied to claims arising under state law and
then transferred from one federal district court to another pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
(2018). That rule stems from the Supreme Court’s decision in Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376
U.S. 612 (1964), and it requires the federal court to apply the law of the state of the transferor
court. See id. at 639. Notably, however, Van Dusen does not require a federal court to apply
the procedural law of another jurisdiction. See id at 642–43.
260
Cf. Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 639 (“A change in venue under § 1404(a) generally
should be, with respect to state law, but a change in courtrooms.”).
261
Prior to amendments to the patent act in 2011, the Federal Circuit did not have
exclusive jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaims arising under the patent laws. See
supra note 42. Consequently, if there were no patent claims on the face of the plaintiff’s
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Circuit to be applied. The Federal Circuit would therefore need to develop and apply
patent law at the appellate level.262
Were the Federal Circuit to develop patent law at the appellate level, while
otherwise applying the law of the regional circuit court in which the case originated,
the court’s practice would closely resemble the court’s current rule. To be sure, it
would not explicitly rely on the substance-procedure dichotomy. But, as applied, the
rule very likely would rely on a similar formulation to identify substantive patent
issues. Such a rule would bring with it all the same problems that exist with the
present rule. The only difference would be that, without a decisional rule that
expressly relies on the substance-procedure dichotomy guiding the court, the Federal
Circuit might be even less transparent when making substantive law determinations.
2. Develop and Apply the Law of the Federal Circuit
While the prior rule would apply the law of the originating court to all legal
issues, another alternative would require the Federal Circuit to apply and develop its
own law to all legal issues. For example, if a plaintiff filed suit in the Northern
District of Illinois, asserting both copyright and patent claims, on appeal, the Federal
Circuit would apply Federal Circuit law to the copyright issues, the patent issues,
and the procedural issues, rather than applying Seventh Circuit law to the copyright
issues and non-patent procedural issues. Some version of this rule has been
suggested by at least a few commentators.263 Under this “own-law” rule, the Federal
Circuit’s precedent, once developed, would bind the district courts in appropriate
cases, such that the district court would apply the Federal Circuit’s precedent in all
future similar cases. Appropriate cases would be cases that are within the Federal
Circuit’s appellate jurisdiction. Such a rule would reflect the appellate path of the
case.264 Thus, to return to the example, the Northern District of Illinois would also
complaint, those sorts of compulsory counterclaims would be appealed to the regional
circuit. However, in those instances, because the regional circuit courts had jurisdiction over
very few patent-related claims, they would look to and apply the patent law of the Federal
Circuit. See Schinzing v. Mid-States Stainless, Inc., 415 F.3d 807, 811 (8th Cir. 2005) (“In
examining this case, we adopt the Federal Circuit’s precedent on substantive issues of patent
law.”). I am grateful to Tim Holbrook for sharing this insight and providing this example.
262
Theoretically, another alternative exists: Instead of developing patent law at the
appellate level, the Federal Circuit could defer to the patent law determinations of the district
courts. This practice, however, seems highly unlikely because it would essentially transform
the Federal Circuit’s appellate review, such that it would resemble the type of deferential
review normally accorded agency determinations. See Jennifer E. Sturiale, Hatch-Waxman
Patent Litigation and Inter Partes Review: A New Sort of Competition, 69 ALA. L. REV. 59,
93 (2017) (noting that the Federal Circuit applies a more deferential standard of review to
determinations by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board than it does to decisions by the district
courts).
263
See, e.g., Dreyfuss, A Case Study, supra note 16, at 44–45; Moore, supra note 16, at
800; Karol, supra note 16, at 3.
264
Cf. Robert Ragazzo, Transfer and Choice of Federal Law: The Appellate Model, 93
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apply Federal Circuit law to the copyright issues and the non-patent procedural
issues, as well as the patent issues. District courts are well accustomed to assessing
whether a case falls within their jurisdiction.265 Therefore they should be able to
determine whether a case falls within those described in § 1338 and can additionally
be appealed to the Federal Circuit.
The own-law rule has a lot of appeal. First, the rule does not rely on the
substance-procedure dichotomy and consequently would not require the court to
characterize issues to conform with it. Second, because the Federal Circuit would
develop and apply its own law to all issues, it could ensure that issues pertaining to
patent law—regardless of whether presented as strictly substantive issues or
contained within procedural issues—are decided in a uniform manner. Third, the
rule would very likely prevent the Federal Circuit from departing from the transsubstantivity principle. Without the court’s complicated choice-of-law rule
interposing in its analysis, it would be readily apparent if the court were inclined to
apply patent law differently from one procedural context to the next. This
transparency would very likely force the court to justify its inconsistent substantive
determinations, which would have the concomitant effect of enabling scrutiny of the
court’s rationale. Alternatively, such transparency could discourage the court from
making such determinations in the first place. Fourth, insofar as the court’s present
rule does, indeed, facilitate the specialization of the Federal Circuit, the own-law
rule would prevent that effect by enabling the court to engage in its core function of
interpreting, applying, and developing procedural law.
At the same time, the own-law rule likely undermines the court’s other
objectives. First, the rule would encourage regional-circuit/Federal-Circuit forum
shopping. Under the own-law rule, Federal Circuit law would apply to all issues.
Consequently, no longer would a litigant gain an advantage with respect to
procedural issues266 simply from filing suit in one circuit over another. Thus, the rule
MICH. L. REV. 703, 706–07 (1995) (arguing that, in cases arising under federal law and
transferred from one federal court to another pursuant to § 1404 or § 1407, federal courts
apply the law of the circuit to which a case will be appealed). Under the present version of
the Federal Circuit’s jurisdictional statute, cases within its appellate jurisdiction are those
“arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents or plant variety protection.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295(a)(1) (2018). Those cases constitute a subset of cases falling within the district court’s
subject matter jurisdiction, as provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2018). Section 1338
provides, “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under
any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and trademarks.”
28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2018). Thus, the district courts would apply the law of the Federal
Circuit if the case fell within the Federal Circuit’s appellate jurisdiction and the district
court’s subject matter jurisdiction. And in all other instances, a district court would follow
the law of the regional circuit court that geographically embraced it.
265
See, e.g., Local 377, RWDSU, UFCW v. 1864 Tenants Ass’n, 533 F.3d 98, 99 (2d
Cir. 2008); Micei Int’l v. Dep’t of Commerce, 613 F.3d 1147, 1151 (D.C. Cir. 2010); cf.
United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002) (“[I]t is familiar law that a federal court
always has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction.”).
266
To be sure, the own-law rule would do nothing to prevent forum shopping motivated
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would discourage regional-circuit/regional-circuit forum shopping. But if the
Federal Circuit developed and applied its own procedural law, litigants might gain
an advantage from having Federal Circuit, as opposed to regional circuit, law apply.
This advantage would incentivize parties to add patent claims or counterclaims
simply to get their cases within the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit. The legislative
history of the court’s enabling statute was concerned about this very problem.267
Thus, the own-law rule would be at odds with Congress’s intentions.
Second, the own-law rule creates its own administrability difficulties. The rule
would require district courts to apply Federal Circuit precedent if that is the court to
which the case would ultimately be appealed. But the appellate path of a case is not
necessarily apparent at the outset of a case. Complaints can be amended,268
counterclaims added,269 or cases consolidated.270 Any of these events may result in
patent claims entering a case and changing a case’s appellate path.271 These sorts of
everyday procedural developments would raise difficult questions about whether
district court rulings that occurred before patent claims were added to the case should
be revisited and, ironically, what law the Federal Circuit should apply to those issues
by issues other than the applicable procedural law.
267
See S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 5 (1981), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 15; H.R.
REP. NO. 97-312, at 20-21 (1981).
268
See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(1) (providing that a party is entitled to amend its pleading
once within 21 days of service of a pleading or 21 days after the earlier of service of a
responsive pleading or a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f)); id. at (a)(2) (providing that a
party may amend at any time with opposing party’s written consent or court’s leave).
269
See FED. R. CIV. P. (13)(1) (providing circumstances under which a pleading must
state a compulsory counterclaim); 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (providing for Federal Circuit
jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaims arising under the patent laws).
270
See FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a) (permitting consolidation of actions); In re Innotron
Diagnostics, 800 F.2d 1077, 1081–81 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (concluding the Federal Circuit had
jurisdiction over case that had patent claims after consolidation). But see generally Microsoft
Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 564 Fed. Appx. 586 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (transferring appeal of
consolidated case containing patent claims from Federal Circuit to Ninth Circuit because the
Ninth Circuit had presided over appeal of preliminary injunction before the case was
consolidated and, pursuant to the law of the case, the court adhered to the Ninth Circuit’s
prior jurisdictional ruling).
271
If, however, any of these events resulted in patent claims exiting a case, the Federal
Circuit’s jurisdiction would not change. As long as a patent claim satisfied the well-pleaded
complaint rule at the outset of the litigation, then the court continues to maintain jurisdiction
over the case, even if the patent claims are no longer in the case. See, e.g., Abbott Labs v.
John F. Brennan, 952 F.2d 1346, 1349–50 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“The path of appeal is
determined by the basis of jurisdiction in the district court, and is not controlled by the district
court’s decision or the substance of the issues that are appealed. . . . [T]he direction of appeal
to the Federal Circuit does not change during or after trial, even when the only issues
remaining are not within our exclusive assignment.”). The Federal Circuit’s decision in
Oracle v. Google, 886 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2018), is a recent example: By the time the case
got to the Federal Circuit, the patent claims were no longer a part of the suit; only the
copyright claims remained. See id. at 1185 n.2.
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on appeal. This sort of inquiry has the potential to take the court down a path much
like the one it is already on, creating many of the same problems.272 Moreover, under
the own-law rule, district courts would continue to apply regional circuit law to all
cases that were not on an appellate path to the Federal Circuit. Thus, the rule would
continue to require district courts to look to the law of two courts of appeals and
essentially serve two masters.
Another factor to consider is the competency of the Federal Circuit. Others have
argued that federal courts are competent to decide issues of federal law and,
therefore, there is no need for a federal court to defer to the judgment of a sister
court.273 This argument is perhaps most notably made in In re Korean Air Lines
Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983,274 a decision by the D.C. Circuit authored by then-Judge
Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Korean Air Lines involved an aircraft destroyed by the Soviet
Union over the Sea of Japan.275 A number of wrongful death actions were filed
against the airline in numerous federal district courts.276 The Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation transferred the various actions to the District Court for the
District of Columbia for pre-trial proceedings.277 The question presented to the
district court was whether the airline’s damages were limited pursuant to
international agreement.278 The district court considered but refused to follow
Second Circuit precedent that concluded that the airline’s damages were limited.279
The issue presented to the D.C. Circuit was whether the law of the transferor
forum—i.e., Second Circuit law—should apply to claims transferred to the MDL.280
The D.C. Circuit agreed with the district court. It concluded that the MDL court
should be “free to decide a federal claim in the manner it views as correct without
deferring to the interpretation of the transferor circuit.”281 The court noted,
272

For example, one can imagine the court deciding to apply the regional circuit law to
issues decided prior to the addition of the patent claims, whether pursuant to a new choiceof-law rule, the law of the case, or otherwise. If the regional circuits’ law was inconsistent
on these issues, the court may again be developing law within the Federal Circuit in an
inconsistent manner. And the district courts would continue to be responsible to more than
one appellate court.
273
See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, Conflicts Among Circuits and Transfers Within the
Federal Judicial System, 93 YALE L.J. 677, 701–02 (1984) [hereinafter R. Marcus, Conflicts
Among Circuits], discussed in Karol, supra note 16, at 21–27; see also Karol, supra note 16,
at 38–40 (concluding that the Federal Circuit should not defer to the judgment of the regional
circuits, in part because it suggests the court is not competent to make independent
determinations of federal procedure).
274
829 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
275
Id. at 1172.
276
Id.
277
Id.
278
See In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 664 F. Supp. 1463, 1464
(D.D.C. 1985).
279
See id. at 1474, 1478.
280
See Korean Air Lines, 829 F.2d at 1174.
281
Id. (quoting R. Marcus, Conflicts Among Circuits, supra note 273, at 721).
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[T]he federal courts have not only the power but the duty to decide issues
of federal law correctly. There is no room in the federal system of review
for rote acceptance of the decision of a court outside the chain of direct
review. If a federal court simply accepts the interpretation of another
circuit without independently addressing the merits, it is not doing its
job.282
Korean Air Lines has emerged as the dominant choice-of-law rule for cases
arising under federal law and transferred within the federal system.283 On the face of
it, the D.C. Circuit’s opinion would seem to suggest that a federal court has an
obligation to apply its own law. Indeed, at least one scholar has suggested as
much.284
But it is not clear that Korean Air Lines should be read so broadly. First, the
considerations underlying Korean Air Lines are very different than those underlying
the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule. The precise question and context of the
federal choice-of-law issue in Korean Air Lines is entirely different from that of the
choice-of-law issue presented to the Federal Circuit. Korean Air Lines importantly
considered what law should be applied at the trial court level to cases transferred as
part of an MDL,285 not what law should be applied at the appellate court level. An
MDL can be created by transferring cases from any (and all) of the federal district
courts embraced by any (and all) of the twelve circuits. Had the D.C. Circuit adopted
a choice-of-law rule that required an MDL judge to apply the law of the transferor
court, a judge presiding over an MDL constituted of cases from more than one circuit
would have to manage those cases on separate, circuit-specific tracks for the duration
of the pretrial proceedings. And although cases transferred to an MDL are supposed
to be remanded back to the transferor court at the completion of the pretrial
proceedings, most cases are settled or disposed of before the MDL judge.286 Thus,
282

Id. at 1175 (quoting R. Marcus, Conflicts Among Circuits, supra note 273, at 702);
cf. Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485, 488–89 (1900) (interpreting the
Evarts Act and concluding that one regional circuit was not bound by or obligated to follow
the law of another regional circuit that had previously decided the very same issue).
283
See, e.g., Menowitz v. Brown, 991 F.2d 36, 40 (2d Cir. 1993) (adopting Korean Air
Lines in multidistrict litigation); Bradley v. United States, 161 F.3d 777, 782 n.4 (4th Cir.
1998) (applying law of transferee court in suit transferred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a));
Murphy v. F.D.I.C., 208 F.3d 959, 964-66 (11th Cir. 2000) (same); see also Jennifer E.
Sturiale, The Unseen Force in Civil Litigation: The Chief Justice’s Appointment of the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (April 25, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author).
284
See R. Marcus, Conflicts Among Circuits, supra note 273, at 679.
285
A full examination of the MDL choice-of-law rule is beyond the scope of this article.
I undertake such an examination in other work. See generally Sturiale, supra note 283.
286
Data from 2017 indicate less than three percent of the cases transferred to an MDL
since 1968, when the multidistrict litigation statute was enacted and the JPML was created,
have been remanded back to the transferor court. See ADMIN. OFF. OF U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL
PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION – JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2017 (2017),
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the rule would have been very difficult for MDL judges to administer, while
providing almost no benefit to the court that transferred the action to begin with.287
In adopting its choice-of-law rule, the Federal Circuit was motivated by some
of these very same considerations. For example, the Federal Circuit was concerned
about imposing a rule on district courts that would require them to apply the law of
more than one circuit. And at the trial court level, the court’s rule attempts to achieve
similar ends—i.e., it attempts to have trial courts apply one body of familiar
procedural law. But the court’s unique jurisdiction, combined with the fact that the
court was adopting a rule to be implemented at the appellate level, resulted in the
Federal Circuit adopting a rule that requires it to apply multiple bodies of law.
Second, there are examples within the federal system that undercut the force of
Korean Air Lines’ reasoning.288 Specifically, there are instances in which federal
courts refrain from making independent determinations about federal law, choosing
instead to defer to the judgment of another tribunal. For example, consistent with
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and Supreme
Court precedent construing that statute,289 a federal court may not grant a prisoner’s
habeas corpus petition based on its independent interpretation of the applicable
federal law. Instead, a federal court may only grant habeas relief if the state court’s
decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law.”290
Similarly, under the Administrative Procedure Act,291 and the Court’s
jurisprudence construing it, a federal court reviewing an agency’s construction of a
statute does not independently construe the statute if Congress has not directly
spoken to the precise question at issue.292 Rather, as long as the agency’s

http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/judicial-panel-multidistrict-litigation-judicialbusiness-2017 [https://perma.cc/YH3T-5FYP].
287
Professor Bob Ragazzo argues for the contrary rule: He argues that the MDL judge
should apply the law of the transferor court, which would reflect the appellate path of the
case and the fact that cases transferred to an MDL are supposed to be remanded back to the
transferor court at the completion of pretrial proceedings. See Ragazzo, supra note 264, at
746–69. Ragazzo’ s argument, however, does not reflect the present-day reality that an MDL
judge may not permanently transfer a case to itself pursuant to § 1404(a), see Lexecon Inc.
v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 27–28 (1998), and that cases made
a part of an MDL are rarely remanded.
288
Thanks to Vicki Jackson for suggesting the examples.
289
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 367 (2000).
290
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2018); Williams, 529 U.S. at 410 (“[T]he most important
point is that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect
application of federal law.”).
291
5 U.S.C. §§ 500–596 (2018).
292
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.11 (1984) (“The
court need not conclude that the agency construction was the only one it permissibly could
have adopted to uphold the construction, or even the reading the court would have reached
if the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding.” (citations omitted)).
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interpretation of the statute is a “permissible construction,”293 a federal court defers
to the agency’s construction. These examples suggest that priorities other than
“decid[ing] issues of federal law correctly” may sometimes justify a court refraining
from “independently addressing the merits” of a case.294
Finally, even if Korean Air Lines accurately describes an obligation of the
federal courts, it is not clear that the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule contravenes
that obligation. In adopting its choice-of-law rule, the Federal Circuit was arguably
engaged in a legitimate exercise of its substantive lawmaking authority. In other
words, the court was exercising its duty to decide an issue of federal law. It may
simply be the case that the relevant issue of federal law—i.e., the issue of what
precedent the Federal Circuit should apply—requires the court to defer to the
regional circuits in the instances outlined by the court. Thus, the court’s unique
jurisdiction and the challenges it presents may justify the court’s deference to the
regional circuits on issues of procedural law.
In sum, the own-law rule would better enable the Federal Circuit to develop
and apply patent law in a uniform and transparent manner, and to do so while
engaging in a core judicial function of procedural lawmaking, thereby avoiding
becoming over-specialized. But the rule does so at the cost of encouraging regionalcircuit/Federal-Circuit forum shopping. Moreover, implementing the rule may be
challenging and produce some of the same problems the present rule does.
***
When the costs of these three rules—the Federal Circuit’s present rule, along
with the two alternatives—are compared against the benefits of these rules, no rule
emerges as clearly better than the others. As a practical matter, the originating-court
rule is likely no different than the present rule, and, therefore, requiring the court to
adopt a new rule and change its practice hardly seems worth the trouble. The ownlaw rule, in contrast, is more promising. It better enables the Federal Circuit to
achieve uniformity of patent law, one of the principle reasons for the creation of the
Federal Circuit in the first place. But this rule too risks causing some of the same
problems as the present rule, while also encouraging the very forum shopping that
Congress sought to avoid.
So, what is the Federal Circuit to do? Although, in adopting its choice-of-law
rule, the court contemplated many of the values analyzed above, the court’s analysis
was not appropriately fulsome. But as the above discussion indicates, even a more
fulsome analysis does not point inextricably in favor of one rule over another.
Without congressional intervention, the court must make a normative determination
as to what objectives are valued more: ensuring uniformity of patent law,
constraining judicial lawmaking, discouraging forum shopping (of one type or

293
294

Id. at 866.
Korean Air Lines, 829 F.2d at 1175.
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another), avoiding the specialization of the Federal Circuit, or ensuring the ease of
administration of the chosen rule.295
The fact that the Federal Circuit was created primarily to develop patent law in
a uniform manner suggests that preserving its ability to make patent law uniform
should be paramount. But as the discussion above suggests, even the rule most likely
to encourage uniformity—the own-law rule—does not entirely obviate the problem
of disuniformity. The own-law rule would require the court to engage in the difficult
task of determining what law should apply to district court rulings in cases where
patent claims are later added to the case, potentially causing the court to continue to
apply regional circuit law to at least some procedural issues. Thus, regardless of
whether the court adopts a new choice-of-law rule, it will have to sit uncomfortably
with some amount of disuniformity.
B. A Structural Solution
The above discussion has been confined to examining the Federal Circuit’s
present choice-of-law rule and potential alternative rules. But as the discussion hints,
the root cause of the problems identified with both the court’s rule and the
alternatives is ultimately the court’s unique jurisdiction. Because the court may hear
appeals from any of the federal district courts, situated in any of the twelve courts
of appeals, the court must cope with the fact that the cases it hears originate in
circuits that have differing procedural law.
A full consideration of the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction, the problems it
presents, and potential solutions to those problems is beyond the scope of this
Article. However, here, two potential structural solutions are worth considering. One
way of addressing the problem would be to create specialized patent trial courts
whose decisions would be appealed directly and exclusively to the Federal Circuit.
These dedicated trial courts would apply one uniform body of both substantive
295

Indeed, the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule requires evaluation of normative
priorities in much the same way that the Erie Doctrine does. Both require consideration of
whether uniformity and trans-substantivity of procedural law (which is justified on grounds
of constraining judicial lawmaking) justify overriding other interests that are at stake. In the
context of the Erie Doctrine, those other interests are the states’ authority to define
substantive law. See Suzanna Sherry, A Pox on Both Your Houses: Why the Court Can’t Fix
the Erie Doctrine, 10 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 173, 173–174 (2013) (arguing that resolving
difficult Erie issues requires a “normative justification” that “depends on whether we place
a greater value on the uniformity and transsubstantivity of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, or on states’ ultimate authority to define substantive rights”). In the context of the
Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule, the other interests are, among other things, the
uniformity of patent law and respecting regional circuit differences. For the reasons
discussed supra Section III.C, uniformity of patent law very likely justifies departing from
the uniformity and trans-substantivity of procedural law, more generally. In other words, the
Federal Circuit is very likely justified in making patent-specific procedural law. However,
respecting regional circuit differences—at least by the Federal Circuit—likely does not
justify the court developing procedural law in disparate ways.
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(patent) law and procedural law—the law of the Federal Circuit. Dedicated,
specialized trial courts would obviate the choice-of-law issue, which, in turn, would
enable the Federal Circuit to develop one uniform body of both substantive (patent)
law and procedural law.
This solution, however, is not without its challenges. It would obviously require
additional resources. In addition, the creation of permanent specialized courts at the
trial court level is likely to be controversial. Judge Diane Wood, for example, has
extolled the virtues of the generalist judge296 and has recommended that the Federal
Circuit no longer have exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals.297 It is, therefore,
unlikely that such a proposal is politically feasible.
Another possibility is to take advantage of, and experiment with, the Patent
Pilot Program (“PPP”). The PPP is a ten-year program aimed at making patent
litigation more predictable and efficient by encouraging some amount of
specialization in the district courts.298 The PPP achieves these goals by enabling
judges within certain districts299 to decline to hear patent cases randomly assigned
to them300 and allowing others to volunteer to be “designated” by their respective
chief judges to have the declined cases randomly reassigned to them.301 These
reassigned cases are then added to those initially assigned to the designated judges
under the standard random-assignment process.302 Thus, designated judges hear a
disproportionate number of patent cases.303 The PPP could therefore be thought of
296

See, e.g., Diane P. Wood, Generalist Judges in a Specialized World, Speech at a
Symposium on Dennis Patterson’s Law and Truth: Law, Truth, and Interpretation (Feb. 11,
1997), in 50 SMU L. REV. 1755, 1767–68 (1997) (“In my view, the contributions of the
generalist judiciary are still far too great to abandon.”).
297
See Hon. Diane P. Wood, Keynote Address: Is It Time to Abolish the Federal
Circuit’s Exclusive Jurisdiction in Patent Cases? (Sept. 26, 2013), in 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL.
PROP. 1, 9–10 (2014).
298
See 155 CONG. REC. H3457–58 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 2009) (statement of Rep. Schiff);
see also Randall R. Rader, Addressing the Elephant: The Potential Effects of the Patent
Cases Pilot Program and Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1105, 1106
(2013) (“Congress created this ten-year pilot project with the goal of increasing U.S. district
court judge expertise and efficiency in adjudicating patent cases.”).
299
The Administrative Office of the United States Courts designated the districts from
the fifteen judicial districts with the most patent filings in 2010 or from the districts that had
adopted local rules for patent cases. Act of Jan. 4, 2011, Pub. L. No. 111–349, § 1, 124 Stat.
3674, 3675.
300
See id. §§ 1(a)(1)(B) (random assignment), (C) (may decline to accept the case).
301
Id. §§ 1(a)(1)(A) (designated by chief judge), (D) (declined cases randomly
reassigned to designated judges).
302
See id. §§ 1(a)(1)(B), (D).
303
See, e.g., MARGARET S. WILLIAMS ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., PATENT PILOT
PROGRAM: FIVE-YEAR REPORT 31–32 (2016), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2016/
Patent%20Pilot%20Program%20Five-Year%20Report%20(2016).pdf [https://perma.cc/83
G8-QU7A] (reporting that seventy-six percent of all patent cases filed in pilot districts are
before a designated judge).
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as creating temporary specialized patent trial courts of a sort. The program started
in 2011 and is scheduled to expire in 2021.304
In reviewing decisions by these designated judges relating to cases that were
initially declined, the Federal Circuit could apply its own precedent to issues of
substantive patent law and develop and apply its own procedural law. This proposal
would aim to capture the benefits, while avoiding the costs, of the own-law rule.
First, assuming these cases are identified as patent cases at the outset of the
litigation—which is arguably what would enable judges assigned such cases under
the normal procedure to decline to hear them, in the first place—the designated
judges would necessarily know the appellate path of the case from the beginning.
Second, because the designated judges have “opted in” to hear a disproportionate
number of patent cases, it is likely that they have a greater interest in substantive
patent law. And from that interest, there is a suggestion—although it is far from
clear—that they are more willing to invest in learning and applying Federal Circuit
law, including non-patent law. The proposal could therefore avoid the
administrability difficulties that might otherwise obtain with the own-law rule.
Third, because the designated judges are only assigned a case once it has been
declined by a judge through the normal procedure, a litigant would not know when
it initially filed its complaint whether a judge would ultimately decline to hear it and
that it would be assigned to a designated judge. Thus, the proposal would avoid
regional-circuit/Federal-Circuit forum shopping. In addition, to avoid the costs of
the own-law rule, this proposal would enable the Federal Circuit to begin to create
a uniform body of procedural law both at the appellate level and at the trial court
level.
This proposal, however, hinges on the assumption that patent cases are
accurately identified as such at the outset of the litigation. But it is not clear that the
PPP-participating district courts review a case’s identification as a “patent case” for
accuracy before permitting the case to be reassigned, nor, if they do, that they do so
uniformly.305 It is therefore possible that some cases that are reassigned to the
designated judges will not actually implicate issues of patent law. In other words,
there will be some false positives. Likewise, it is possible that some cases that
ultimately turn out to be patent cases will not be reassigned because they are not
properly identified at the outset of the case. There will consequently be some false
negatives. Ultimately, the consequences of these errors would be that the subset of
cases to which the Federal Circuit could apply its own law would be smaller. The
false negatives, having never been reassigned, would be excluded from having the
proposed solution apply to them; likewise, the false positives would be excluded
once it was determined that they did not truly raise issues of patent law. Still, the
proposal would nonetheless provide the Federal Circuit with an opportunity to
experiment with developing and applying its own precedent.

304
305

See Act of Jan. 4, 2011, supra note 299, § 1(c).
Thank you to Mark Lemley for helping me to identify this potential problem.
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CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit’s unique jurisdiction has created unique problems for the
court, including a difficult decision regarding which Court of Appeals’ law to apply.
The structural solutions discussed above are aimed at preventing the court from
having to engage in any choice-of-law analysis whatsoever because once the court
goes down the road of characterizing issues—whether as procedural versus
substantive, or even as patent versus non-patent—in service of determining what
law to apply, the problems discussed above seem unavoidable. Thus, barring these
or other structural solutions, the Federal Circuit will have to continue to wrestle
uncomfortably with the choice-of-law question and the many conundrums it
presents.

